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There is a curious contradiction about anger. On the one hand anger has been defined as 
a ‘toxic’ emotion. For example, Smith (1759, p. 58) identified anger as the “greatest 
poison to the happiness of a good mind”, and Bain (1865, p. 129) argued that “the 
distinctive feeling of anger implies the impulse knowingly to inflict suffering upon 
another sentient being and to derive a positive gratification from the fact of suffering 
inflicted”. More contemporary scholars that have built on this theoretical and empirical 
work confirmed that anger involves negative antecedents, experiences, and 
consequences (e.g., Averill, 1982; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Frijda, 1986, 1987; 
Izard, 1991; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Russell, 1991). 
 
On the other hand, anger has been identified as a moral emotion. Moral emotions are 
linked to the interest and welfare of persons other than the self (Haidt, 2003). There are 
many cases in which angry people stand up for the right of others and behave in ways 
that have positive consequences for society (e.g., Frank, 1988; Haidt; Kahneman, 
Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Smith, 1759). Not only is anger moral in the sense that it is 
felt over hurt inflicted upon others, there are also some preliminary indications that it 
may induce prosocial behaviors (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Wakslak, Jost, 
Tyler, & Chen, 2007; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). For example, Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, 
and Fetchenhauer (2011) have shown that in cases where people experience anger 
because of unfairness done to someone else, people use both punishment of a 
perpetrator as well as compensation of a victim as justice interventions. The question is 
when, why, and how anger leads to more punitive or to more compensatory behaviors, 
or whether such findings should be accounted for by some other mechanism. This 
dissertation presents seven chapters containing theoretical analyses and empirical 
studies in order to come to a first answer to this question.  
 
What is Anger? 
 
If I were to succinctly describe the core of research on anger it would be that anger is 
about blame and goal attainment. One of the scholars that provided comprehensive 
work on anger is Averill. He defines anger as an emotion that primarily ensues when 
“frustration is occasioned by the actions of another person, actions which are appraised 
by the angry individual as unjustified or at least avoidable” (Averill, 1982, p. 129).  He 
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further said that: “The typical instigation to anger is a value judgment. More than 
anything else, anger is an attribution of blame” (Averill, 1983, p. 1150). Also Frijda, 
Kuipers, and Ter Schure (1989) defined anger as an emotion that concerns other-blame: 
“Anger and related emotions corresponded to appraisal of a negative event caused by 
another person (agency other), and involving unfairness. Appraisal of other’s agency, 
found with anger in all studies similar to ours, is shared by distrust, startle, and, 
understandably, jealousy.” Or, in the words of Lewis (2001, p. 215): “Anger rapidly 
couples with the appraisal that someone is at fault”. Hence, feeling angry does not just 
tell us that something went wrong, but that someone else is responsible for this 
wrongdoing (Schwarz, 2002).  
 
Blame appears to be an important determinant in differentiating anger from other, 
related emotions, such as frustration, annoyance, and irritation (which belong to 
different subcategories in the same emotion cluster, see Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & 
O’Connor, 1987). For example, Clore, Ortony, Dienes, and Fujita (1993) have stated that: 
“Perceptions of blameworthiness (attributions of blame) are an important element in an 
emotion we call anger, but they are not important in another angerlike emotion that we 
call frustration” (p. 60), and “The formal specification of anger is, disapproving of 
someone else’s blameworthy action and being displeased about the related undesirable 
event” (p. 69). Thus, anger has a focus on blameworthy actions and undesirable 
outcomes whereas frustration only has a focus on undesirable outcomes. Averill (1983, 
p. 1151) adds that anger-like emotions such as frustration or annoyance are not just 
different from anger because of intensity, but more because of seriousness:  
A person might get angry over the killing of baby seals, but only annoyed by 
someone loudly chewing gum, although the latter could be more immediately 
upsetting. This brings us back to the issue of blame. Anger has a moral 
connotation that annoyance does not, and morality cannot be reduced to a 
matter of intensity, in the sense (say) of physiological arousal.  
 
Goal blockage has often been discussed in relation to anger as well, and has generally 
been accepted as an important determinant of anger (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 
2004; Frijda, 1986; Kuppens et al., 2003; Scherer, 1984, 1993). Note that goal blockage 
has also been termed as a goal-path obstacle (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), goal/need 
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conduciveness (Scherer, 1984), motivational incongruence (Smith & Lazarus, 1993), 
motive-inconstant goal blockage (Roseman & Smith, 2001), or as an undesirable event 
(Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). In general, it refers to appraising an event as blocking 
one’s goals, which causes the anger. 
 
If a negative event is not appraised as blocking one’s goals, anger will most likely not be 
experienced. Or, as Roseman and Smith (2001, p. 16) stated: “If one blames another 
person for a negative event that is not really motive-incongruent or that would be 
motive-incongruent for most people but is not for the individual experiencing the event, 
no anger will be felt”. Thus, if I blame the baker for not making the bread I ordered, 
forcing me to eat yoghurt for a week, I will not feel angry in response to this ‘negative’ 
event if I don’t really mind eating yoghurt for a week.  
 
Other elicitors of anger – which might be seen as more specific instances of the general 
themes of other blame and goal blockage – are violations of social norms or salient 
values, and injustice/inequity (e.g., Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009; Scherer, 1984). Especially in the domain of injustice, anger has 
received different labels throughout various literatures. For example, we know 
empathic anger (anger on behalf of a victimized person; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003), 
personal anger (anger at harm to self, O’Mara Jackson, Batson, & Gaertner, 2011), or 
indignation, moral outrage, or moral anger (anger at violation of a moral standard or 
norm; Batson et al., 2007; Elster, 1998; O’Mara et al.). In this dissertation I will use the 
term ‘first-party anger’ when I mean anger over being harmed oneself, and ‘third-party 
anger’ when I mean anger over someone else being harmed, which often entails the 
violation of a moral standard or norm.   
 
What Behaviors do Angry People Display? 
 
In order to understand the emergence of behavior following anger, it is helpful to look 
at anger’s central concern (Frijda, 1986). The central concern is what gives rise to an 
emotion and defines what people strive for when experiencing a certain emotion. An 
emotion signals that one’s concern is at stake, and that something in the current 
situation needs to be changed. Hence, knowing what the central concern of an emotion 
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is means that we can predict emotion ensuing behaviors. Emotions prioritize behavior 
in order to deal with the concern in question (Frijda; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, 
Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). As discussed previously, anger is an emotion with a 
general concern for goal attainment, meaning that behavior that follows from anger is 
aimed at removing the obstacle to attain the goal.  
 
Studies that have looked at the behavioral consequences of anger are relatively scarce, 
but have convincingly shown that people respond with antagonistic behaviors when 
their goal has been blocked. For example, anger has been shown to lead to aggression 
(e.g., Berkowitz, 1990), revenge taking (e.g., Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003), 
assault or opposition (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), and punishment (e.g., Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014). However, when looking at third-
party situations (i.e., where anger is experienced because someone else is harmed), 
there are clear indications that anger can have prosocial consequences. Previous 
research already pointed towards more positive behaviors stemming from anger (e.g., 
Fischer & Roseman, 2007), and correlational studies have related anger to a support for 
and prosocial activities in favor of the disadvantaged (Montada & Schneider, 1989; 
Wakslak et al., 2007), helping a victim (Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003), and compensation 
of victims (Iyer et al., 2007; Lotz et al., 2011). 
 
It is important to note that third-party situations allow for prosocial behavior to emerge 
whereas first-party situations generally do not (as acting prosocially towards oneself is 
often not possible). Still, research on anger has often only included the option to act 
antagonistically. For example, in the context of economic games, research finds that 
norm violations that lead to anger elicit higher punishment to those norm violators 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip et al., 
2014). The literature on economic games and altruistic punishment has neglected other 
types of justice interventions such as compensation. Hence, if angry people would have 
been inclined to act prosocially towards a victim, there was often no possibility to do so. 
Although administering punishment can have positive consequences for upholding 
morality and cooperation in society (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher; Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; 
Kahneman et al., 1998; Smith, 1759), it is not considered a prosocial act.  
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In this dissertation I focus on the behavioral consequences of anger in third-party 
situations and argue that anger can lead to prosocial behavior when the option to do so 
is included. More specifically, it is investigated when, why and how anger leads to 
prosocial behavior.  
 
Overview of Chapters 
 
The chapters in this dissertation are based on individual papers that are published or 
under review. As a consequence, the co-authored chapters contain “we” instead of “I”.  
Furthermore, the chapters are written such that they can be understood separately, but 
they can also be read as part of a set. The order of the chapters reflects the development 
of my reasoning about anger1.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on behavioral consequences of anger, and proposes 
that the behavioral consequences can be explained from an equity perspective (i.e., the 
idea that angry people want to right wrongs/restore equity).  
 
Chapter 3 is aimed at experimentally establishing whether anger leads to prosocial 
behavior. The most important finding is that prosocial consequences stem from third-
party anger (where there is a possibility to act prosocially towards a victim), and that 
acting prosocially towards a victim is preferred over punishment of a perpetrator. 
These prosocial effects of anger seem to occur independently from empathic concerns.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates when anger leads to prosocial behavior, by testing the equity 
perspective as proposed in Chapter 2. The most important finding is that anger leads to 
prosocial behavior when one can still restore equity with that behavior; when equity is 
already restored by compensation of the victim or punishment of the perpetrator, one’s 
anger and one’s own motivation to act prosocially towards the victim decrease. 
                                                   
1 The following applies to all studies in this dissertation: all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and 
all measures are reported. Studies with U.S. Mturk workers had a HIT approval rate of 95% or more and 
received $0.10-$0.25 for their participation. When there was an inequality of variances when testing 
differences between means using t-tests, corrected degrees of freedom are reported. We use Cohen’s d for 
effect sizes of t-tests. In case of a paired samples t-test, we used the following formula to calculate Cohen’s 
d:  √   .  
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Together these results suggest that anger is an emotion with an equity-restoring goal, 
and provide insight into the anger-prosocial behavior link by showing that anger only 
leads to prosocial behavior when one can restore equity with that behavior. 
 
Chapter 5 is focused on investigating the robustness of the preference for compensation 
over punishment; a coincidental but consistent finding from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In 
six studies it is consistently found that people prefer compensation of a victim over 
punishment of a perpetrator when varying both the situation as well as the contribution 
that compensation and punishment have in restoring equity. This chapter informs us 
about people’s behavioral preference in trying to resolve situations of inequity or of 
social transgression.  
 
Chapter 6 presents a potential application of the prosocial consequences of anger into a 
consumer context. More specifically, in this chapter it was found that anger can act as an 
emotional appeal in soliciting charitable donations: When a donation serves a specific 
equity restorative function as compared to a non-restorative function, only angry 
participants donated more to charity.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the results from all chapters. It also 
outlines important implications and suggestions for future research that can be derived 
from the results.  
1
















This chapter is based on: Van Doorn, J., Zeelenberg, 
M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2014). Anger and 
prosocial behavior. Emotion Review, 6, 266-273. 
doi:10.1177/1754073914523794
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Anger is often primarily portrayed as a negative emotion that motivates antagonistic, 
aggressive, punitive, or hostile behavior. In this chapter it is proposed that this 
portrayal is too one-sided. A review of the literature on behavioral consequences of 
anger reveals evidence for the positive and even prosocial behavioral consequences of 
this emotion. A more inclusive view of anger and its role in upholding cooperative and 
moral behavior is outlined, and a possible role of equity concerns including new 
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Anger and Prosocial Behavior 
 
Anger is typically seen as a negative emotion. It is elicited by situations that are seen as 
undesirable, it feels bad (i.e., it has a negative valence), it motivates goals of getting back 
at others, and leads to behaviors that are generally disadvantageous to others, such as 
complaining, exclusion, and overt aggression and punishment (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; 
Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Greitemeyer & 
Rudolph, 2003; Lemay, Overall, & Clark, 2012; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Van Coillie & Van Mechelen, 2006). 
Indeed, the evidence for anger – in all its aspects – as a negative emotion seems to be 
strong.  
 
In the current article, we do not dispute this evidence, but rather we propose a richer 
perspective that suggests the view of anger as a negative emotion is one-sided. Anger is  
associated with both negative and (in)directly positive behavioral consequences. By 
direct positive consequences we refer to the prosocial or compensatory behaviors of 
angry people towards others. By indirect positive consequences we refer changes in 
others' behavior that benefit us and that are a response to expressions of anger. This 
review of the anger literature centers around two main points. First, we argue that 
prosocial behaviors can originate directly from the experience of anger. Second, taking a 
functional perspective (e.g., Frijda, 2004; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 
2008), we seek to explain both antagonistic and prosocial consequences of anger in 
terms of equity concerns.  
 
Before expounding the two main points it may be useful to describe how we view anger 
and its central concern. According to Frijda (1988, p. 351): “Emotions arise in response 
to events that are important to the individual's goals, motives, or concerns. Every 
emotion hides a concern, that is, a more or less enduring disposition to prefer particular 
states of the world. A concern is what gives a particular event its emotional meaning.” 
The concern defines what people strive for when feeling a certain emotion. Most 
emotion research conceptualizes anger as an emotion stemming from intentional goal 
blockage by another agent (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Scherer, 1984, 1993). Appraisals of intentional goal 
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blockage elicit feelings of anger, which are characterized by a motivation (and 
concomitant action tendencies) to remove the obstacle and attain the desired goal.  
 
In interpersonal contexts, this general concern translates into a concern for equity or 
just relations (e.g., Scherer, 1984; Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008). For 
example, in an analysis of seven emotions among 2,921 participants in 37 countries, 
Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998, p. 769) found that “Anger producing events 
were most frequently perceived as very unfair (…). Events experienced as unjust were 
described as more immoral, more obstructive to plans and goals, and having more 
negative effects on personal relationships” (italics added). Put differently, anger is about 
getting even. 
 
Please note that we do not argue that all experiences of anger are about equity or 
justice. We do argue that this is the case for interpersonal anger, which is the focus of 
this review. In the literature on the behavioral consequences of anger, the reader may 
encounter different terms, such as moral outrage, personal anger, or empathic anger 
(e.g., Batson et al., 2007). Although different terms may be used, all these constructs 
appear to concern interpersonal anger.  
 
The motivation to restore equity can lead to different types of behavior. In dyadic 
situations, the most commonly observed behavior is punishment. Lowering the 
outcomes of a perpetrator leads to more equitable relations. Central to the current 
paper is that in triadic (three party) situations another behavioral alternative is 
available, namely compensation. When people observe an unfair or inequitable situation 
(e.g., an unfair distribution of resources) this allows for equity restoration through 
either punishing the perpetrator (e.g., taking away money) or compensating the victim 
(e.g., giving money). In dyadic situations, where people themselves are treated unfairly, 
the only viable option to restore equity is to punish the perpetrator as it is unlikely that 
people can compensate themselves. Thus, even though the anger experience may be the 
same in dyadic and triadic situations, the different affordances in these situations allow 
for different behavioral consequences (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001).  
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We present our argument by first discussing the common negative view of anger and its 
empirical foundation. Then, we discuss positive consequences of anger, including both 
indirect and direct effects. After describing the empirical evidence, we describe a 
possible integration of the findings from an equity perspective, and we explain how 
such a perspective relates to existing emotion perspectives about anger-behavior links. 
We end by proposing a research agenda for empirically testing these ideas.  
 
The Negative View of Anger 
 
Anger has featured prominently in treatises of emotions, ever since scholars started to 
consider emotions a worthwhile topic for scientific scrutiny. In 1759, Adam Smith 
identified anger as the “greatest poison to the happiness of a good mind” (p. 58). 
Alexander Bain (1865) argued in a similar vein that “the distinctive feeling of anger 
implies the impulse knowingly to inflict suffering upon another sentient being and to 
derive a positive gratification from the fact of suffering inflicted” (p. 129). Even Darwin 
(1899), known for his nuanced and functional views of emotions and their expressions, 
was quite explicit about the negativity of anger: “(…) an indignant man unconsciously 
throws himself into an attitude ready for attacking or striking his enemy, whom he will 
perhaps scan from hood to foot in defiance” (p. 244-245).  
 
In view of such parity among our intellectual forbearers it is not surprising that many 
contemporary psychologists also highlight the negative effects of anger. For example, 
Izard (1991, p. 241) stated that when an individual experiences anger “there is a feeling 
of power and an impulse to strike out, to attack the source of anger,” and Averill (1982, 
p. 178) argued that “the desire to gain revenge on, or to get back at the instigator of 
anger can almost be taken as a definition of anger.” Studies describing the experiential 
content of anger found that action tendencies, actions, and emotivational goals such as 
feeling like hitting someone and feeling like yelling at someone, saying something nasty 
to someone, wanting to hurt someone, and wanting to get back at someone are 
characteristic of this emotion (cf., Roseman et al., 1994). The anger script includes a 
desire for retribution, a loss of control, and attempts to strike out and harm the offender 
(Russell, 1991). Likewise, Frijda et al. (1989) argued that anger differs from other 
emotions by scoring high on “moving against,” which refers to antagonistic tendencies 
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such as assault or opposition. Finally, both Averill (1982, 1983) and Berkowitz (1989, 
1990), portrayed anger as the subjective state accompanying or driving many forms of 
aggression. Of course, none of these researchers claim that anger only leads to 
aggression or punishment, but the primary focus of these perspectives on the negative 
consequences of anger can be clearly seen.  
 
The negative impulses of anger are not limited to motivations but can also be observed 
in behavior. Research by Bougie et al. (2003) investigated angry behaviors in service 
encounters. In a first study, they found that angry customers felt like behaving 
aggressively, wanted to get back at the organization, and wanted to hurt someone. In a 
second study, they found that experiencing anger predicted negative word-of-mouth 
(WOM; i.e., telling others of one’s social network about the negative service encounter), 
customer complaints aimed at obtaining a remedy or restitution from the service 
provider, third-party complaining (not directly related to the dissatisfying experience 
and external to the consumer’s social circle, such as newspapers and legal agencies), 
and switching between firms. In related research, Wetzer, Zeelenberg, and Pieters 
(2007a) showed that seeking revenge on the firm motivated negative WOM in angry 
consumers (see also, Stillwell et al., 2008). Thus, empirical studies found that anger 
experiences are associated with negative feelings, negative interpersonal inclinations, 
and even negative interpersonal behaviors.  
 
Anger also features prominently in the literature on punishment, albeit more implicitly. 
For example, anger has been proposed to be the proximate mechanism underlying 
third-party punishment (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009). Fiske and Tetlock (1997) argued that taboo trade-offs (which violate 
normative conventions about admissible exchanges and markets) produce strong and 
immediate reactions of moral outrage, leading people to want to punish norm-violators. 
There are a number of factors that moderate the relationship between anger and 
punishment, such as whether the perpetrator had already received punishment 
(Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999), whether participants were accountable while 
determining responsibility and punishment (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998), and 
whether the wrongdoer was identified (Small & Loewenstein, 2005).  
 
2
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Anger has often been associated with aggression. According to the frustration-
aggression hypothesis, frustration or the thwarting of goal-directed behavior promotes 
aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Cognitive neoassociationistic 
theory explains why aversive events increase aggressive tendencies through general 
negative affect and anger is considered to be one of several potential causes of 
aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1989).  
 
Anger also has been judged to lead to offensive behavior within intergroup situations. 
Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) found that participants who perceived the ingroup as 
strong were more likely to experience anger toward the outgroup and to desire to move 
against or harm the outgroup. Furthermore, Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, and Morgan’s 
(2006) results indicate that, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, anger (not fear) 
predicted support for expanding a war against Afghanistan. These studies, however, 
were all conducted during the escalation stage of conflict. Recent research found more 
constructive effects of anger when not examined at the escalation stage of conflict, as we 
discuss later in this paper.  
 
To summarize, anger has often been related to negative feelings and behaviors that 
suggest that anger only results in harm or punishment, or the intention to do so. We 
propose that both the negative behaviors associated with anger and other 
compensatory behaviors are both means to the same end (i.e., the goal of restoring the 
unjust or inequitable relation). However, the specific set-up of past studies has not yet 
enabled a proper test of this idea. As explained in the next sections, there is substantial 
evidence for indirect positive effects of anger and even for direct positive effects.  
 
Indirect Positive Effects of Anger 
 
Though anger is often viewed as antagonistic and destructive, it is also often considered 
to be a moral emotion (e.g., Haidt, 2003), linked to the interest and welfare of persons 
other than the self. Anger can be triggered vicariously, leading to behavior such as 
altruistic punishment that comes at a cost to the actor, but actually conveys benefits 
upon other people and society in general. As a case in point, there is a line of research 
showing that the communication of anger can be beneficial in negotiation settings by 
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eliciting cooperation (e.g., Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Outside of negotiation settings, 
anger could explain why the threat of (altruistic) punishment is enough to deter 
potential free-riding or selfishness in cooperative settings (see Fehr & Fishbacher, 
2004). 
 
Fischer and Roseman (2007) also argued that the expression of anger can be used to 
instigate changes in others’ behavior. When one expresses anger to someone, this 
signals that the relationship with that person is meaningful, important, and worthy of 
pursuing, which may motivate the other person to change his or her behavior in order 
to attain a better outcome. Their studies showed that participants in an anger condition 
reported a higher degree of intimacy with the person they were angry at, and more 
reconciliation intentions (making up, talking it over, and solving the problem) than did 
participants in a contempt condition (though it should be noted that the studies lacked a 
non-emotional control condition).  
 
Along similar lines, several studies have shown that anger makes people want to 
socially share their feelings (Rimé, 2009; Wetzer, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007b). For 
example, it was found that angry people have a motivation to “vent” (Wetzer et al., 
2007a), to  talk to others (Van Coillie & Van Mechelen, 2006), and to speak sooner about 
their anger or fear experiences than about sadness, joy, or love experiences (Rimé, 
Mesquita, Philippot, & Boca, 1991). According Rimé, emotion sharing can enhance 
participants’ social integration and attachment, especially in very intense situations. 
 
To conclude, there are various suggestions in the emotion literature that anger can have 
positive interpersonal consequences. We would like to point to the indirect nature of 
these proposed consequences. It is not the anger itself that leads people to behave 
prosocially, but rather the threat of negative behavior following from anger that leads 
other people to comply or cooperate. Also, it is not the anger itself but rather its sharing 
with others that produces positive consequences. We believe that, though important, 
such indirect positive effects are only part of the story. Below we discuss research 
showing more direct effects of anger on prosocial behavior (i.e., performed by the 
person experiencing the anger).  
 
2
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Direct Positive Effects of Anger 
 
Evidence for direct prosocial consequences of anger has been found as early as 1989 by 
Montada and Schneider. They studied the impact of emotions on the readiness to 
engage in prosocial activities in favor of the disadvantaged. Participants were 
confronted with scenarios describing the problems and misery of different groups of 
people. Emotional reactions towards these problems were assessed, among which were 
anger (moral outrage about the unjust consequences of unemployment), existential 
guilt (about one's own privileges compared the disadvantaged), and sympathy. The 
results revealed that anger was a predictor of prosocial commitment (e.g., claiming 
support for the disadvantaged and the spending of money for charitable goals), even 
more so than existential guilt and sympathy.  
 
A study by Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2007) obtained comparable results for the 
association between moral outrage and support for the disadvantaged. They studied the 
effects of participants’ general emotional distress (by using both a moral-outrage scale 
and an existential-guilt scale) and endorsement of a system-justifying ideology 
(ideologies that justify social and economic inequality) on support for policies of 
redistribution (changes designed to help members of underrepresented groups gain 
jobs or university admission). Moral outrage mediated the effect of system justification 
on support for redistribution, where existential guilt or negative affect in general did 
not.  
 
Two studies by Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel (2007) showed that anger need not to be 
aimed at a specific group to predict prosocial behavior towards that group. Anger aimed 
at the ingroup predicted compensation toward the outgroup: American and British 
participants (ingroup) who perceived their countries to be responsible for illegitimate 
conditions in occupied Iraq (outgroup) reported more anger; anger, in turn, predicted 
action intentions to advocate compensation to Iraq, confrontation of the agents 
responsible, and withdrawal from Iraq. In contrast, guilt did not directly predict any 
political action, and shame predicted only withdrawal from Iraq. Within intergroup 
situations, Halperin, Russell, Dweck, and Gross (2011) have shown that anger aimed at 
an outgroup can have positive effects as well. Inducing anger toward an outgroup 
Chapter 226   |
 
 
increased support for making compromises in upcoming negotiations among those with 
low levels of hatred, but decreased support for compromise among those with high 
levels of hatred. Furthermore, within intergroup conflict, anger is related to a goal of 
correcting wrongdoing and to the promotion of support for positive, non-violent 
policies (Halperin, 2008; Reifen Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011).  
 
Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) showed differences in the effects of trait empathic anger 
and of state empathic anger (anger because someone else is harmed) on actions toward 
victims and transgressors. Participants heard a victim of drunk driving and reported 
their experienced empathic anger and the willingness to engage in actions directed 
toward the victim and transgressor. Results showed that state anger was positively 
related to helping the victim (spend time with the victim) and with punishing the 
perpetrator (circulate a petition to have the driver’s license revoked permanently), in 
contrast to trait empathic anger which was related to neither.  
 
A final example concerns a study by Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, and Fetchenhauer (2011). 
They investigated emotional determinants of third-party punishment and 
compensation. Participants observed a game between two other players and witnessed 
an unfair allocation of money. Participants were either told that the victim was aware of 
this unfair allocation or not. Next, participants responded to questions about their 
emotions, reflecting offender-focused moral outrage (angry, shocked, hostile, distressed, 
and aggravated) and self-focused feelings of threat (anxious, nervous, guilty, and 
confused). Participants were given money that they could use for punishing the 
perpetrator and/or compensating the victim. Moral outrage predicted both participants’ 
assignment of punishment and compensation, regardless of whether the victim knew 
about the unfair allocation or not. Self-focused emotions predicted only compensation 
when the victim knew about the unfair allocation.  
 
The above-mentioned studies are highly consistent in that they show an association 
between experienced anger and prosocial behavior (helping the disadvantaged or the 
ones harmed). Interestingly, most studies not only suggest positive behavior may 
directly follow from anger, they also suggest that anger may motivate two seemingly 
opposite behaviors. Apparently, moral outrage can lead to both punishment of the 
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perpetrator and compensation of the victim (Darley & Pittman, 2003). On the basis of 
the current empirical record it is hard to assess how such positive and negative 
behaviors relate, simply because few studies simultaneously measured antagonistic and 
prosocial behavior.   
 
Before we proceed with a discussion of what these findings imply for our current 
conception of anger, it may be good to briefly think about why the prosocial 
consequences of anger may have been overlooked in most classical and contemporary 
discussions. Most studies on the negative consequences of anger are based on dyadic 
situations, where the person experiencing anger was the victim of the perpetrator’s 
actions. In terms of the behavioral consequences of anger it is entirely understandable 
that we only observe antagonistic behavior in such situations. There is simply no victim 
to be compensated (unless one could compensate oneself). It should be noted that even 
in such situations, people may opt for non-antagonistic behaviors to maintain positive 
relationships (Deffenbacher, Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996). The few studies that did 
include both positive and negative consequences typically did not directly measure 
anger or only as a trait. For example, Chavez and Bicchieri (2013), Leliveld et al. (2012), 
and Van Prooijen (2010) investigated compensation of victims after injustice or 
unfairness, but lacked a measurement of anger. Although it is plausible that anger was 
present in these studies, the absence of a measurement prohibits valid statements about 
anger’s effect on prosocial behavior. Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) found that trait 
anger (how often or how easily people are angered) and state anger (how angry people 
feel right now about a specific situation) elicit distinct behaviors.  
 
To summarize, there appears to be a small yet consistent body of evidence 
demonstrating prosocial effects of anger in third-party situations. In the next section we 
describe our attempt to explain both the positive and negative interpersonal behaviors 
that arise from anger.  
 
An Equity Perspective on Anger 
 
When thinking about how to conceptualize anger in view of the evidence for both its 
positive and negative effects, it is useful to start from a functional perspective. Specific 
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emotions are associated with specific behaviors and behavioral tendencies (Frijda, 
2004; Frijda, et al., 1989; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Roseman et al., 1994). Thus, emotions 
shape and give direction to behavior. This can take a direct route, through specific 
action tendencies that deal with the central concern of the emotion, and a more indirect, 
“cold” route as is described in the notion of affect-as-information (Zeelenberg et al., 
2008). Every emotion centers around a concern, a more or less enduring disposition to 
prefer particular states of the world (Frijda, 1988). A concern is what gives emotional 
meaning to a particular situation. Most scholars agree that the perception of goal 
blockage is a central concern to anger (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Frijda, 
1986; Kuppens et al., 2003; Scherer, 1993). Consequently, behavior following from 
anger is aimed at removing the obstruction.  
 
We believe that in interpersonal contexts, this general concern translates into the 
perception that the goal of equity or justice is obstructed (please note that although we 
use the term equity, equity concern in other literatures is often expressed as justice or 
fairness). Scherer (1984, p. 310) already argued that justice/equity concerns are a facet 
of the central concern of anger. Importantly, an equity perspective can explain why 
anger motivates both antagonistic and prosocial behaviors. Anger reacts to perceived 
violations of equity – as is the case with unjust or unfair situations where the outcome 
for a person elicits an inequitable relation – and motivates a goal to restore equity 
(Stillwell et al., 2008). In third-party situations equity can be restored both by taking 
away the benefits of the perpetrator (i.e., punishment) or by compensating the 
disadvantage of the victim. Either way, equity is restored and the concern of anger is 
satisfied.  
 
In this paper we have focused on the behavioral consequences of anger. However, our 
view also has implications for the antecedents or appraisals of anger. Different 
appraisals tend to be based on different sensitivities and thus motivate different modes 
of action readiness (Frijda, 2004). In the case of anger, when people act antagonistically 
or prosocially in response to the concern for equity, this might suggest inequity to be a 
more specific interpersonal appraisal of goal blockage. In an abstract sense goal 
obstruction is the appraisal that applies to all forms of anger. In interpersonal contexts 
this concern may manifest itself as a specific appraisal of equity/fairness violations. As 
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Scherer (1984) suggested, the same general appraisal may manifest itself differently in 
different contexts.  
 
Within the punishment literature, we also find support for an equity perspective. For 
example, Raihani and McAuliffe (2012) show that equity, and not reciprocity, is the 
driving motivation behind punishment. Furthermore, individuals in many cultures seem 
to be inclined to reject or punish others who give too much, those who make so-called 
hyper-fair offers (e.g., Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008). Although anger has not been 
explicitly measured in these studies after being confronted with the inequity, it appears 
that inequity motivates punishment to restore equity. 
 
Equity can also be restored via compensation. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) 
already suggested that in dyads a perpetrator can restore injustice by compensating the 
victim. We argue that also in triads, where one is not the perpetrator but observes an 
inequitable situation, people are motivated to compensate the victim. A final illustration 
of an equity perspective can be found in Goldberg et al.’s (1999) study. They found that 
anger elicited by injustice carried over to judgments of unrelated acts of harm only 
when the perpetrator went unpunished. These results suggest that when equity is 
restored, the need for punishment disappears. 
 
The equity perspective also differs from an empathic perspective, meaning that anger-
induced compensation is independent from empathy-induced compensation. An 
illustration of this position is the research by Lotz et al. (2011) who manipulated 
whether or not victims knew that they had been victimized by an unfair allocation. 
Results showed that regardless of whether or not victims knew they had been 
victimized, moral outrage predicted participants’ assignment of punishment and 
compensation, providing evidence that it is the anger itself and not empathy triggered 
simultaneously that motivates the restoration of equity and thus the prosocial behavior. 
After all, the goal of empathy is to comfort someone, but if the victim does not know 
about the unfair allocation there is no one to comfort.  
 
Related illustrations can be found in Blader and Tyler (2002) who showed that both 
empathy and justice principles motivated prosocial behavior, but that familiarity is an 
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important determinant of empathy and not of justice principles. Justice theory suggests 
that we feel concerned even when a loathsome person for whom we feel little empathy 
is the victim of injustice. Although anger was not explicitly mentioned in this 
relationship between justice principles and prosocial behavior, the emotion appraisal 
literature shows that injustice is an important elicitor of anger (Mikula et al., 1998). In 
addition, Montada and Schneider (1989), discussed previously, showed that moral 
outrage was a predictor of prosocial commitment, even more so than sympathy; a 
construct very much related to empathy (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990).  
 
An equity perspective may help to understand results which seem to contradict the 
positive relation between anger and prosocial behavior. For example, Weiner, Perry, 
and Magnusson (1988) reported that individuals with mental-behavioral stigmas (e.g., 
drug abusers) evoked relatively high anger in individuals, and elicited generally low 
support for personal assistance and charity. Individuals with a physical stigma (e.g, 
blindness), however, evoked relatively low anger and more support for personal 
assistance as well as charitable donations. Also Polman and Ruttan (2012) showed that 
angry participants donated less money to research on cancer than participants not 
experiencing this emotion. At first sight, these studies appear to contradict the anger-
compensation relationship. However, when analyzed from an equity perspective, these 
studies have in common that participants were unable to restore equity through 
prosocial behavior. Helping someone or donating to charity are behaviors that, in these 
cases, cannot contribute to righting a wrong. So, the fact that anger only correlated with 
negative behaviors might be explained by the absence of an equity restoring option.  
 
Note that the differential effects of anger could also be explained from an attribution 
perspective (e.g., Weiner, 2006; Weiner et al., 1988). When we attribute blame to a 
person then anger towards that person leads to negative, punitive behaviors; however, 
the same anger may predict prosocial behaviors towards other people whom we do not 
blame. This explanation differs from an equity perspective in the sense that attribution 
is about the perception of blame in people and equity is about perception of the 
undesirable situation. Although very compatible, both views would lead to different 
predictions. We predict that only victims of inequity should be compensated and not 
just any needy person in an anger situation. Also, prosocial compensation should 
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diminish when inequity has been restored by a third party (e.g., an insurance company), 
which is hard to explain from the attribution of blame which has not changed. 
 
Summary and Research Agenda 
 
The goal of this review was to propose that prosocial and constructive behaviors can 
originate directly from the experience of anger, and to explain behavioral consequences 
of anger by taking a functional perspective that describes anger as an emotion with an 
equity-restoring goal. As shown in the studies reviewed, anger can have clear positive 
consequences, both indirectly by shaping other people’s behavior, and directly through 
evoking prosocial or compensatory behavior in the angry person.  
 
By this we do not propose that anger is a prosocial emotion but rather that the prosocial 
consequences of anger can be complementary to the negative, antagonistic behaviors. 
Anger itself is neither positive nor negative, only its consequences can be classified as 
such. In the words of Tavris (1989, p. 259): “Anger is good or bad depending on its use, 
not its nature.” Of course, the experience of anger is characterized by a negative valence 
(Solomon & Stone, 2002), but this is because it signals that the concern for equity is 
threatened or violated, and that action is needed (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).  
 
Whether antagonistic or compensatory behaviors will arise might be dependent upon a 
secondary appraisal of the constraints and affordances that a situation offers with 
respect to restoration of equity. In the case of dyadic situations where oneself is the 
victim of an inequitable situation, compensatory behaviors are constrained by the fact 
that one cannot compensate oneself, leaving only punishment as the most obvious 
option to deal with the inequity. Triadic situations, where one observes an inequitable 
situation, allow for compensation of the victim and for punishment of the perpetrator. 
However, if punishment is the only equity restoring option given, it is likely that such an 
option is selected. This does not mean that people do not want to compensate, it is just 
that the situation does not allow for such behavior to be expressed.  
 
An important addition to our thesis is that we believe that the prosocial consequences 
of anger that we described occur independently of experienced empathy. Put 
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differently, we do not think that anger solely predicts negative behavioral effects and 
that any concomitant positive effects are explained by simultaneous experiences of 
empathic concern. Although this prediction has not yet been thoroughly tested, we 
believe that the literature that we described before lends it some plausibility. For 
example, although trait empathy is a predictor of compensation to a victim (Leliveld et 
al., 2012), research that includes a measurement of anger seems to suggest that anger 
affects prosocial behavior over and above the effects of trait empathy (Blader & Tyler, 
2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Furthermore, Lotz et al. (2011) found no effect of 
victim visibility on restoration of inequity and thus the prosocial behavior, suggesting 
that empathy cannot explain why compensation also occurs in such situations. 
 
Our beliefs about what anger is and what anger does, do not only have consequences for 
how we interpret existing research but also how we conceptualize future research. 
Previous research might have been able to show prosocial effects of anger if it had 
included a standard measure of anger as well as simultaneous measures of 
compensatory and retaliatory behavior. The studies that we discussed as showing a 
relation between anger and prosocial behavior were correlational in nature. 
Furthermore, anger was operationalized in many different ways, including generalized 
anger (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007), moral outrage specifically (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 
1989; Wakslak et al., 2007), or empathic anger (e.g., Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). 
Although different terms are used, all these constructs appear to concern the same 
anger experience as they focus on someone else getting harmed. Finally, sometimes 
anger is reported as a mediating factor, and sometimes it is not, meaning that several 
other factors in combination with anger are considered. Future studies on anger and 
behavior may benefit from a clear operationalization of anger and related constructs as 
well as from different behavioral options, including compensatory and retaliatory 
options.  
 
Although our ideas follow from previous research and theorizing on anger, it is 
important to note they are still speculations to be proven by empirical evidence. For this 
reason, we would like to outline some potential research ideas to empirically test the 
assumption that anger has direct prosocial effects. A first step would be to conduct an 
experimental study that manipulates anger and subsequently asks for antagonistic and 
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prosocial action (tendencies), to ascertain what is a viable response and whether one 
response may be more frequent than the other. Second, it would be interesting to look 
at the preference for either antagonistic or prosocial behavior, seeing that both 
punishment and compensation can restore equity. Lotz et al. (2011) already showed 
that individuals have a preference for both punishment of a perpetrator and 
compensation of a victim, and that compensation was preferred over punishment. 
Unfortunately, as anger was not manipulated in their study we cannot draw the 
conclusion that anger might elicit a preference for either punishment or compensation, 
which would give specific insight into the potential prosocial qualities of anger. There 
may be clear social benefits from compensation over punishment because the former 
builds positive interdependent relations where the latter does not. Although research 
points in the direction that angry people are inequity averse, this obviously needs 
further studying. Third, as outlined previously, research should consider whether 
inequity can be judged as a form of goal blockage, a form of injustice, a specific 
appraisal, or just an aversive event. Fourth, it may be instructive to study the prevalence 
of anger in dyadic, triadic and group settings. This may also provide information 
concerning the goals of anger and how we can expect anger to be manifested 
behaviorally.   
 
In sum, our review of the current literature on the behavioral consequences of anger 
suggests a broader perspective on anger than the common negative perspective. We 
believe that there are compelling reasons to expect direct prosocial consequences of 
anger. This diversity can be understood from the perspective that, in interpersonal 
situations, the behaviors stemming from anger are aimed at restoring equity. Though 
this perspective still needs to be supported by direct empirical research, we believe that 
it yields an interesting, integrative view of anger, as well as some specific predictions 












This chapter is based on: Van Doorn, J., Breugelmans, S. 
M., & Zeelenberg, M. (2014). Prosocial consequences of 
third-party anger. Manuscript under review. 




Anger has traditionally been associated with aggression and antagonistic behavior. A 
series of studies revealed that experiences of third-party anger can also lead to 
prosocial behavior. Three naturalistic studies showed that first-party anger (anger 
because people themselves were harmed) and third-party anger (anger because other 
people were harmed) occur equally often, are felt equally intensely and both stem from 
perceptions of unfairness. More pronounced differences were found in the behaviors 
following from the anger. Four experimental studies revealed that third-party anger can 
lead to prosocial behaviors aimed at the victim, and that there is a preference for such 
prosocial behaviors over antagonistic behaviors. It is concluded that behaviors 
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Prosocial Consequences of Third-party Anger 
 
Anger is one of the most frequently experienced emotions (e.g., Schimmack & Diener, 
1997). It is elicited by events that are unpleasant or undesired, such as situations of goal 
obstruction, injustice, or unfairness (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Frijda, 
1986, 1987; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Scherer, 1993). Because 
of its prevalence and because the experience of anger typically involves negative 
situations and feelings, it is not surprising that this emotion has long been seen as one of 
the most exemplary negative emotions (e.g., Averill, 1982; Berkowitz, 1990; Izard, 1991; 
Russell, 1991). 
 
Interestingly, the behaviors that angry people display appear to be diverse and not so 
unambiguously negative. Anger is an approach-motivated emotion (Carver & Harmon-
Jones, 2009) that brings forth an effort to remove the violation of what ‘ought’ to be 
(Frijda, 1986). Studies have suggested that this approach motivation can take the form 
of aggressive, punitive, and antagonistic behaviors as well as to more positive behaviors 
such as social sharing, compensation to a victim, and helping the disadvantaged (e.g., 
Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lemay, Overall, & Clark, 2012; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlosser, 
& Fetchenhauer, 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Rimé, 
2009; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Van Coillie & Van Mechelen, 2006; Wetzer, 
Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007b; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). This mix of 
antagonistic behaviors (aimed at hurting the perpetrator) and prosocial behaviors 
(aimed at helping the victim) suggests that the predominant view of anger as a negative, 
antagonistic emotion may be too narrow.  
 
Still, previous studies showing a direct relation between anger and prosocial or helping 
behaviors are scarce; most studies on antagonistic and prosocial behavior did not 
measure or manipulate anger (for a review, see Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 
2014). In this paper we aim to extend our view of anger by showing when anger leads to 
prosocial behavior, and seek to explain both antagonistic and prosocial consequences of 
anger in terms of equity concerns.  
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Before we describe the rationale of our studies it is useful to note that in this article we 
use the term prosocial behavior to refer to behavior aimed at helping a victim in order to 
restore equity. We do not propose that anger leads to a general tendency to act 
prosocially to anyone or at any time. In fact, as we explain below, we believe it is crucial 
to differentiate between first and third-party anger to understand the various 
behavioral expressions of anger.  
 
First-party and Third-party Anger 
 
We can experience anger both as a result of the harm done to ourselves (first-party 
anger) and as a result of the harm done to someone else (third-party anger). Although 
first and third-party anger might feel similar, there are reasons to believe that the 
behaviors that follow from these emotional experiences are different. With this we do 
not suggest that there are necessarily two different forms of anger; instead we argue 
that different situations offer different behavioral constraints and affordances for the 
expression of anger’s approach-motivation (cf., Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001). For 
example, being angry after unjustly receiving a disadvantageously low amount of money 
could lead to the restoration of equity by punishing the perpetrator who distributed the 
money. Being angry because someone else unjustly received a disadvantageously low 
amount of money could lead to the restoration of equity by punishing the perpetrator, 
but also by compensating the ‘victim’. Thus, observers of inequity (i.e., being a ‘third 
party’) have a wider range of restorative behaviors at their disposal than victims of 
inequity do. After all, victims can rarely compensate themselves.  
 
It has already been shown that various prosocial behaviors aimed at restoring equity 
may occur in third-party situations. For example, Lotz et al. (2011) found that people 
generally compensated more than they punished in third-party situations. Furthermore, 
Leliveld, Van Dijk, and Van Beest (2012) found that people who scored high on 
dispositional empathy had a preference for compensating victims instead of punishing 
perpetrators in these situations. Though these studies have shown that people both 
compensate and punish, the question is what drives people to act prosocially in triadic 
situations? We have reason to believe that anger, which has hitherto been associated 
only with third-party punishment (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002), can also motivate third-
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party prosocial acts. Anger has often been related to antagonistic behaviors, but the goal 
of anger is not to harm or to punish. Both punishment of a perpetrator and 
compensation of a victim can act as a means to the end of restoring unjust or inequitable 
relations (e.g., Frijda, 2004; Van Doorn et al., 2013). We believe that in interpersonal 
situations the general concern of anger, namely goal blockage (e.g., Berkowitz & 
Harmon-Jones, 2004; Kuppens et al., 2003; Scherer, 1984, 1993), translates into a 
concern for equity (e.g., Scherer, 1984; Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008). This 
would imply that the behaviors following from anger are aimed at restoring equity. In 
third-party situations this is often done in an antagonistic manner, in third-party 
situations equity can also be restored in a prosocial manner.  
 
Given that there are multiple ways to right certain wrongs in third-party situations, it is 
surprising that in experimental research punishment has often been the only option 
given to participants (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009). In the few examples in which the research included prosocial 
options, moral outrage (anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard has 
been violated; see Batson et al., 2007) substantially correlated with both participants’ 
assignment of punishment to a perpetrator and compensation to a victim (Darley & 
Pittman, 2003; Lotz et al., 2011). In a similar vein, Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) found 
that empathic anger was positively related to both helping a victim and with punishing a 
perpetrator; Montada and Schneider (1989) and Wakslak et al. (2007) showed that 
moral outrage correlates with prosocial activities such as donating money, signing 
petitions, and supporting social projects in favor of the disadvantaged; and Iyer et al. 
(2007) suggested that anger aimed at the ingroup predicted compensation to an 
outgroup. Although these findings are suggestive of a relationship between anger over 
someone else got harmed (third-party anger) and prosocial behavior, none of these 
studies included manipulations of anger leads to prosocial behavior in triadic situations, 
where there is a possibility to act prosocially towards the victim. On the basis of the 
findings by Lotz et al. (2011), we could even expect angry people to prefer 
compensation of a victim to punishment of a perpetrator as a way of restoring equity. In 
compensation, the victim is helped out of his/her disadvantageous position; punishing 
the perpetrator may also restore justice, but this only puts the perpetrator in a 
disadvantageous position and does not take away the harm done to the victim. Thus, 
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compensation of a victim seems to be a more positive approach, consistent with the do-
no-harm principle (Baron, 1995).  
 
We further expect compensation to be a direct result of the anger, which is independent 
from the empathic concerns that may be triggered simultaneously (Leliveld et al., 2012). 
Some initial support for this expectation can already be found in the experiment by Lotz 
et al. (2011), who found that visibility mattered for empathy: the goal of empathy is to 
comfort someone, but if the victim does not know about the unfair allocation there is no 
one to comfort. Visibility, however, did not matter for anger, which correlated to the 
restoration of injustice in all cases. According to Blader and Tyler (2002), justice theory 
suggests that we feel concerned even when a loathsome person for whom we feel little 
empathy is the victim of injustice. Although anger was not explicitly mentioned or 
examined in this relationship, the emotion appraisal literature shows that injustice 
indeed is an important elicitor of anger (Mikula Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998). Montada 
and Schneider (1989) even showed that moral outrage was a stronger predictor for 
prosocial behavior than sympathy - a construct very much related to empathy 
(Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). In sum, the effects of anger and empathy on compensation 
are expected to be independent of one another.  
 
The Current Studies 
 
We report here three naturalistic studies and four experimental studies using a variety 
of methods to investigate how often third-party and first-party anger are experienced 
and what their behavioral consequences are. All methods have been proven useful for 
studying emotions and their consequences in previous research. Of course, each method 
on its own has its idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses. As a set, though, these 
different methodologies inform us about the potential prosocial consequences of anger. 
In Studies 3.1a—c we were interested in the prevalence of third-party and third-party 
anger experiences and their consequences. Thus, how often do people actually 
experience third-party anger and third-party anger, how recent are these experiences, 
do these experiences differ in emotion intensity, judgments of how unfair the situation 
was, and in how people act on their anger? The studies showed that experience of third-
party anger and third-party anger hardly differ (i.e., they occur equally often, are felt 
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equally intensely and both stem from perceptions of unfairness), but that they do differ 
in their behavioral consequences (such as in prosocial and antagonistic behavior). Study 
3.2 showed in addition that prosocial behavior was displayed more often than 
antagonistic behavior in third-party anger situations.  
 
Study 3.3 proved a first experimental test of whether experiences of anger 
(autobiographical recall) spillover to prosocial behavior in a third-party situation. This 
study shows that angry people are more willing to compensate a victim of unfairness, 
and that they are willing to do so more than punishing the perpetrator. This study also 
shows these effects to be independent of trait anger and trait empathy. Study 3.4 found 
that angry participants preferred compensation over punishment when forced to 
choose. Finally, Study 3.5 shows that it is the experienced anger over injustice and not 
merely the injustice in itself that motivates prosocial behavior towards the victim.  
 





Mturk workers (294 males, 234 females; Mage = 29.28, SD = 9.33), participated in this 
study on anger experiences. They were asked to remember their most recent anger 
experience, and to write down how long ago this happened. Subsequently, participants 
indicated whether they were angry because they were harmed (first-party anger; FPA), 
someone else was harmed (third-party anger; TPA), or because of another reason 
(which, if selected, they were requested to explain). Next, participants indicated how 
angry they were in the episode, on a slider scale ranging from 0 (not at all angry) to 10 
(very angry), and how unfair the episode was, on a slider scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
unfair) to 10 (very unfair).  
 
 
                                                   
2 There were no gender effects in any of the studies. For reasons of clarity we recoded the original slider 
scales in Studies 3.1a-3.1c and 3.5. The original slider scales scores ranged from 0 to 100, which we 
divided by ten. Studies 3.3 and 3.4 were part of a larger testing session. 




The results are shown in Table 3.1. Based on participants’ own classification of the 
‘type’ of anger (FPA, TPA, or other), we found that 28% of the freely recalled anger 
episodes was FPA, 10% was TPA, and 62% involved another reason for being angry. 
Participants in the ‘other’ category sometimes did mention episodes of self-harm or 
other-harm. Therefore, we re-categorized these ‘other anger’ episodes, which yielded 
percentages of 49% FPA, 13% TPA and 38% other (mostly cases of frustration). These 
three categories formed the independent variable (labeled Condition) in subsequent 
analyses. 
 
We created a scale of how long ago the reported anger episodes happened, by coding 
the reporting time in days and subsequently by making categories (same day, last week, 
last month, last year, last 5 years, or over 5 years). The order of ranking of the 
categories in which most anger episodes occurred did not differ between the FPA and 
TPA conditions, Mann Whitney U –test; Z = -1.13, p = .260, but did differ between FPA 
and other, Z = -2.80, p = .005, and between TPA and other, Z = -2.94, p = .003. For all 
anger types, most episodes had occurred in the same week.  
 
A MANOVA showed that there was an effect of Condition on ratings, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.95, F(4, 1046) = 7.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .03. Separate ANOVAs showed that there were no 
differences between conditions in anger intensity, F(1, 524) = 2.73, p = .066, ηp2 = .01. 
There were significant though small differences on unfairness ratings, F(1, 524) = 13.65, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .05. The other condition was less unfair than both the FPA and TPA 
conditions. 
  
                                                   
3 One participant indicated that he had not experienced anger recently, and so this participant was left out 
of the analyses. Thirty participants did not explicitly say how long ago the anger episode had happened 
and could therefore not be categorized. 
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Table 3.1  
Study 3.1a: Percentages of Recentness of Episodes, and Anger and Unfairness Ratings as a 




Recentness of episode  
First-party anger 
(n = 245) 
Third-party anger 
(n = 65) 
Other anger 
(n = 188) 
Same day 13.1% 10.8% 20.2% 
Same week 59.6% 55.4% 
 
60.6% 
Same month 13.9% 15.4% 14.9% 
Same year 11.4% 13.8% 4.3% 
Same 5 years 2.0% 3.1% 0% 
More than 5 years ago 0% 1.5% 0% 
Anger intensity 6.31 (2.38)a 6.63 (2.01)a 5.93 (2.41)a 
Unfairness ratings 6.70 (3.13)a 6.66 (3.30)a 5.17 (3.39)b 
Note. Anger intensity ratings could range from 0 (not at all angry) to 10 (very 
angry). Means with the same subscript did not differ significantly from each other, F(1, 
524) = 2.73, p = .066, ηp2 = .01. Unfairness ratings could range from 0 (not at all unfair) 
to 10 (very unfair). Means with a different subscript differ significantly from each other, 








A new sample of Mturk workers (274 males, 195 females; Mage = 29.16, SD = 9.51) were 
randomly assigned to the FPA condition or the TPA condition. They were asked to 
remember the most recent episode in which they experienced anger because they were 
harmed (FPA condition), or because someone else was harmed (TPA condition), and 
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write down how long ago this had happened. In an open-ended question participants 
were asked how they had acted upon their anger. Next, participants indicated how 




The results are shown in Table 3.2. Like in Study 3.1a, we created categories of how long 
ago the reported anger episodes had happened. The order of ranking of categories 
differed between the FPA and TPA conditions, Mann Whitney U –test; Z = -2.64, p = .008. 
Third-party anger experiences occurred more recently than first-party anger 
experiences. Within the FPA condition, most anger occurred the same week or same 
year, and within the TPA condition, most anger occurred the same week. 
 
Participants’ responses were categorized by the first author as either antagonistic 
(aimed at the perpetrator, such as punching), prosocial (aimed at the victim, such as 
helping or comforting), venting (such as cursing, crying, and social sharing; not 
specifically aimed at the perpetrator or the victim), mediation (such as intervening or 
filing a police report), no act, or an act that does not fall into one of these categories 
(such as when it is unclear whether the behavior is aimed at the perpetrator or the 
victim and/or when behavior is not specifically positive or negative). Within both the 
FPA and TPA conditions participants most often indicated that they did not act after 
experiencing the anger. 
 
We ran a MANOVA of Condition on ratings of anger and unfairness, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, 
F(2, 462) = 5.89, p = .003, ηp2 = .03. Separate ANOVAs showed that there were no 
differences between conditions in anger intensity, F(1, 463) = 0.05, p = .833, ηp2 = .00. 
Participants in the TPA condition indicated that the situation was more unfair than 




                                                   
4 Four participants indicated that they had never experienced the type of anger that we asked for, and so 
these participants were left out of the analyses. Furthermore, 43 participants did not explicitly say how 
long ago the anger episode had happened and could therefore not be categorized. 
3




Study 3.1b: Percentages of Recentness of Episodes and Behavior, and Anger and Unfairness 
Ratings as a Function of Condition 
 
Note. Anger intensity ratings could range from 0 (not at all angry) to 10 (very 
angry). Means with the same subscript did not differ significantly from each other, F(1, 
463) = 0.05, p = .833, ηp2 = .00. Unfairness ratings could range from 0 (not at all unfair) 
to 10 (very unfair). Means with a different subscript differ significantly from each other, 
F(1, 463) = 10.36, p = .001, ηp2 = .02.  
 Condition 
 
Recentness of episode  
First-party anger 
(n = 214) 
Third-party anger 
(n = 212) 
Same day 3.7% 3.3% 
Same week 28.5% 38.7% 
 Same month 19.2% 18.9% 
Same year 28.5% 29.7% 
Same 5 years 14.5% 7.1% 
More than 5 years ago 5.6% 2.4% 
Behavior 
First-party anger 
(n = 233) 
Third-party anger 
(n = 232) 
Antagonistic 22.3% 10.4% 
Prosocial 0% 4.3% 
Venting  16.7% 12.5% 
Mediation  2.6% 7.3% 
No act 52% 59.5% 
 Other 6.4% 6.0% 
Anger intensity 6.64 (2.33)a 6.60 (2.22)a 
Unfairness ratings 6.18 (3.29)a 7.09 (2.83)b 






A new sample of Mturk workers (329 males, 221 females; Mage = 28.79, SD = 8.97) 
participated in this study on anger experiences. They read a short introduction on anger 
types and indicated how often they experience FPA and TPA, on separate slider scales 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (frequently). In an open-ended question participants 
indicated what percentage (from 0% to 100%) of anger episodes in their life had been 




Participants indicated that, in general, they had experienced FPA more often in life (M = 
5.76, SD = 2.65) than TPA (M = 5.26, SD = 2.38), t(549) = -3.86, p < .001, d = -0.16, 
although the effect was very small. Of all the anger episodes in participants’ lives, a 
mean percentage of 39.33% (19.87) was FPA, which was somewhat higher than the 
35.56% (18.88) of TPA, t(549) = -2.72, p = .007, d = 0.12, which in turn was higher than 
the mean percentage of 25.10% (21.08) which was due to other reasons, t(549) = 7.06, 
p < .001, d = 0.30.  
 
Discussion 
From these three naturalistic studies it appears that FPA and TPA are more or less 
equally prevalent and intense. Differences are mainly found in the responses that follow 
from these two anger experiences. Previous research has largely focused on FPA and its 
behavioral consequences, which has contributed to the view of anger being an 
antagonistic emotion. However, TPA is experienced frequently and seems to have 
different and more prosocial consequences, making it worthwhile and important to 
further investigate. In what follows we build on these preliminary findings and show 
examine in experimental settings whether FPA and TPA lead to different behaviors as 
well.   
 
In the next study, we asked participants to recall and describe an occurrence in which 
they experienced FPA or TPA. We further asked about the behaviors engaged in during 
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the described anger experience, such as helping the victim or hurting the perpetrator, to 






Tilburg University students (20 males, 109 females, three unspecified, Mage = 19.57, SD = 
2.79) were randomly assigned to the FPA or TPA condition. They described a situation 
in which they felt angry because they got harmed (FPA condition) or because someone 
else got harmed (TPA condition). They described the cause and the development, as 
well as their thoughts, feelings, actions, and how they dealt with their anger. 
Participants indicated how intensely they had experienced anger, guilt, shame, regret, 
frustration, sadness, and fear (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). Participants also 
indicated how much they agreed with nine statements about the situation and their 
actions, concerning either prosocial or antagonistic acts (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Participants were thanked, debriefed, and received course credit for their participation.  
 
Results 
Participants in the TPA condition indicated that someone else got treated unfairly (M = 
6.03, SD = 1.75), more so than participants in the FPA condition (M = 3.02, SD = 2.32), 
t(118.97) = -8.36, p < .001, d = 1.46. Participants in the FPA condition indicated that they 
were treated unfairly (M = 5.80, SD = 1.30), more so than participants in the TPA 
condition (M = 2.88, SD = 2.07), t(107.67) = 9.63, p < .001, d = 1.69.  
 
The results are displayed in Table 3.3. The other emotion means are in the Appendix. 
Anger was equally intense in both conditions. Next to anger, participants in both 
conditions indicated that they experienced frustration as well. Participants in the FPA 
condition indicated that they were more in control of the situation than participants in 
the TPA condition. Within the TPA condition participants indicated that they wanted to 
help or support someone more often than they wanted to hurt or get back at someone, 
ts > 7.37 ps < .001, ds > 0.91.   
 




The results of this study reveal that in triadic situations when one has a possibility to act 
prosocially, anger can lead to prosocial behavior aimed at the victim. This prosocial 
behavior also seemed to be preferred over antagonistic behaviors. The next study 
investigated whether experienced anger spills over to an unrelated triadic situation, and 
whether this is independent from empathic concerns that may be triggered 
simultaneously.
3

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tilburg University students (27 males, 94 females, one unspecified, Mage = 20.37, SD = 
2.11) were randomly assigned to the anger or control condition. Participants completed 
an autobiographical recall task, describing a situation in which they felt angry (anger 
condition) or describing a normal day of the week (control condition). Recalling a 
situation in which a certain emotion was experienced reactivates the emotion and 
thereby also the motivational tendencies associated with that emotion (e.g., Strack, 
Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985). Furthermore, such recall tasks have been effectively 
used in previous studies on the behavioral consequences of emotions (e.g., De Hooge, 
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). Participants first indicated how much anger, 
happiness, shame, regret, sadness, and guilt they felt (1 = not at all, 5 = very strongly) in 
that situation. They next continued with an unrelated task in which they read the 
following scenario (translated from the original Dutch): 
Imagine: You observe a game played by two players, named Mark and Rick. Mark 
and Rick are playing a game in which €100 needs to be divided. Mark gets to 
decide how to divide this money between himself and Rick. Rick has no influence 
on the division of the money. Mark decides to give Rick €40 and to keep €60.  
 
Then, participants read that they themselves owned €50, and that there were three 
options to use that money: compensate Rick (Every euro that they used for 
compensation would increase Rick’s amount with €3), punish Mark (Every euro that 
they used for punishment would decrease Mark’s amount with €3) and/or keep the 
money themselves (cf., Leliveld et al., 2012). Participants filled in the amount of money 
given to Rick, Mark, and themselves which would always add up to €50.5 
 
Participants then completed the 7-item empathic concern scale (α = .83; Davis, 1983, 
1994, as used in Leliveld et al., 2012), and a trait anger scale based on a shortened 
version of the trait anger subscale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (α = 
                                                   
5 For exploratory reasons, we also asked participants to motivate their choice for punishment, 
compensation, or keeping the money themselves in Study 3.3 and Study 3.4. The most prevalent reason 
for choosing punishment or compensation was “the fairest/equitable thing to do”, or that they could use 
the money themselves when choosing neither punishment nor compensation. However, we do not 
describe these results in detail here. 
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.87; STAXI; Spielberger, 1988), because these traits might influence the relation 
between state anger and compensation or punishment (e.g., Deffenbacher, Oetting, 
Lynch, & Morris, 1996; Leliveld et al., 2012; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). Finally, 




The results are displayed in Table 3.4. The other emotion means are in the Appendix. 
Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than participants in the control 
condition. Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than all other 
emotions.  
 
Monetary division. We looked at whether participants were willing to spend their own 
money on punishing Mark or compensating Rick. Although participants in the anger 
condition indicated more often than participants in control condition that they were 
willing to punish Mark (44% vs. 32%) and compensate Rick (65% vs. 54%), these 
differences were not significant; χ²punishment (1, N = 122) = 1.93, p = .165, χ²compensation (1, 
N = 122) = 1.49, p = .222.  
 
An ANOVA6 on the amount of euros spent on compensation revealed a significant effect 
of Condition, F(1, 120) = 4.86, p = .029, ηp2 = .04. Participants in the anger condition 
reported significantly higher amounts of money to compensate Rick than participants in 
the control condition. Participants in the anger condition did not report significantly 
higher amounts of money to punish Mark than participants in the control condition, F(1, 
120) = 1.02, p = .316, ηp2 = .01. Furthermore, participants within the anger condition 
reported higher amounts for compensation than for punishment, t(62) = 2.37, p = .021, 
d = 0.30. Within the control condition, this difference was not significant, t(58) = 1.58, p 
= .119, d = 0.21.  
                                                   
6 There were three extreme outliers (data points that are more extreme than Q1 – 3 * IQR or Q3 + 3 * IQR) 
on the compensation and punishment measures, which were all in the anger condition. We chose not to 
delete these outliers, as we judged these responses as likely and valid, especially because these cases 
appeared in the same condition and might be considered as more intense reactions to the anger 
manipulation. However, when deleting these three cases we see a slight adjustment in one of the effects: 
The effect of condition on compensation becomes marginally significant (F(1, 117) = 3.14, p = .079, ηp2 = 
.04). 
Chapter 352   |
 
 
Traits. The scores on empathic concern (M = 3.40, SD = 1.84) and on trait anger (M = 
6.71, SD = 5.44) did not differ between conditions, which is desirable. Regression 
analyses showed that empathic concern was related only to the amount of money 
participants used for compensation, β = .20, t(120) = 2.17, p = .032, and not related to 
the amount of money used for punishment, β = .15, t(120) = 1.63, p = .106. Trait anger 
was related only the amount of money participants used to punish, β = .23, t(121) = 
2.58, p = .011, and not related to the amount of money used for compensation, β = 
.05, t(121) = 0.57, p = .572. When entering empathic concern as a covariate in the 
ANCOVA with Condition as an independent variable and the amount of compensation as 
dependent variable, condition remained significant, F(1, 118) = 4.56, p = .035, ηp2 = .04. 
In addition, when entering trait anger as a covariate in an ANCOVA with Condition as an 
independent variable and the amount of punishment as dependent variable, the results 
remain non-significant, F(1, 119) = 0.64, p = .427, ηp2 = .01. Thus, controlled for the 
traits empathic concern and anger, state anger still motivated participants to use higher 
amounts of money to compensate the victim as compared to participants not 
experiencing state anger.  
 
Discussion 
This study found that angry people use a higher amount of money for compensation 
than people not experiencing this emotion. Furthermore, within the anger condition, 
more money was spent on compensation than on punishment. Put differently, when 
participants experienced anger they kept less money for themselves than participants in 
the control condition, which they are more likely to use on compensating the victim 
than on punishing the perpetrator. These effects occurred independently from 
participants’ empathic concern. Study 3.4 tests which behavior, compensation or 











Study 3.3: Anger and Monetary Division Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of 
Emotion Condition  
 
Note. Anger scores could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Higher 
scores indicate higher amounts of euros used to punish/compensate. Means with a 









Tilburg University students (61 males, 130 females, one unspecified; Mage = 21.06, SD = 
2.62) were randomly assigned to the anger or control condition. Participants in the 
anger condition read the following scenario: 
Imagine: You observe a game played by two players, named Mark and Rick. Mark 
and Rick are playing a game in which €100 needs to be divided. Mark gets to 
decide how to divide this money between himself and Rick. Rick has no influence 
on the division of the money. Mark decides to give Rick €20 and to keep €80. 
 
Next, participants in the control condition read the same scenario, but here Mark 





Anger (n = 63) 
 
M (SD) 
Control (n = 59) 
 
M (SD) 
Anger 3.67 (0.92)a 1.29 (0.74)b 
Compensation 4.49 (6.12)a 2.51 (3.31)b 
Punishment 2.46 (4.18)a 1.80 (2.95)a 
Self 43.05 (7.98)a 45.69 (5.23)b 
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subsequently indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt they would feel 
in the described situation (1 = not at all, 5 = very strongly).  
 
Then, participants read that they owned €50 and they could choose to compensate Rick 
or punish Mark, or keep all the money themselves. In the case of choosing punishment 
or compensation, participants also indicated how many euros they would spend (Every 
euro used would de/increase the other’s amount with €3). Finally, participants were 
thanked, debriefed, and received €8 or course credit for their participation.  
 
Results 
The results are displayed in Table 3.5. The other emotion means are in the Appendix. 
Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than participants in the control 
condition. Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than all other 
emotions. Participants in the anger condition punished Mark and compensated Rick 
more often than participants in the control condition. The majority of the participants in 
the control condition chose to keep the money. When we only consider the people who 
did not choose to keep the money themselves in the anger condition, results show that 
participants chose more often for compensation than for punishment, χ² (1, N = 45) = 
21.36, p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
These results show that angry participants prefer compensation over punishment, 
whereas such a preference is absent in the control condition. Together, these studies 
support our hypothesis that third-party anger can elicit prosocial behavior aimed at the 
victim and leads even to a preference for prosocial behavior over antagonistic behavior 
in order to restore equity. The final study was designed to examine whether it is indeed 
the experienced anger that motivates prosocial behavior towards the victim (which we 
would expect), and not injustice in itself. Therefore, we kept injustice constant between 
conditions, and varied the amount of anger elicited by manipulating to whom the 








Study 3.4: Anger Means (and Standard Deviations) and Percentages of Monetary Division 





Anger (n = 95) 
 
M (SD) 
Control (n = 97) 
 
M (SD) 
Anger 2.53 (1.17)a 1.07 (0.36)b 
Compensation 40.0% 3.1% 
Punishment 7.4% 0% 
Self 52.6% 96.9% 
 χ² (2, N = 192) = 50.31, p < .001 
Note. Anger scores could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means 









MTurk-workers (138 males, 73 females; Mage = 29.91, SD = 9.35) were randomly 
assigned to the injustice-friend or injustice-stranger condition, and received $0.20 for 
their participation. They read that either their friend (injustice-friend condition) or a 
person they did not know (injustice-stranger condition) was a victim of senseless 
violence during a night out. As an emotion manipulation check, participants 
subsequently indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt they would feel 
in the described situation, on a slider scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very 
strongly). Finally, participants indicated how many dollars (on a range from $0 to $50) 
they would spend on a fund that would pay for the recovery of the friend or stranger, as 
a dependent measure of prosocial behavior.  
 




Emotion means are displayed in the Appendix. Participants in the injustice-friend 
condition experienced more anger than participants in the injustice-stranger. 
Participants in both conditions reported more anger than other emotions. 
 
An ANOVA on the amount of euros spent on the recovery fund revealed a significant 
effect of Condition, F(1, 209) = 85.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. Participants in the injustice-
friend condition (M = 36.00, SD = 16.43) spent more dollars on the recovery fund than 
participants in the injustice-stranger condition (M = 15.66, SD = 15.53). There was a 
significant positive relation between experienced anger and donating behavior in both 
the injustice-friend condition, r(102) = .44, p < .001, and the injustice-stranger 
condition, r(105) = .42, p < .001. This final study is thus consistent with the idea that it is 
not injustice in itself, but the experienced anger that motivates people to act prosocially 




We examined differences between first-party and third-party anger. In three 
naturalistic studies we found that first-party anger and third-party anger occur about 
equally often, are felt about equally intense and both stem mainly from perceptions of 
unfairness. In the four experimental studies that followed, we examined the behaviors 
that are associated with both types of anger. In Study 3.2, where we sampled 
experiences of first-party anger and of third-party anger, we found that prosocial 
consequences of anger are mainly present in the latter, triadic situations, and more so 
than antagonistic consequences. Study 3.3 found that autobiographical recalls of anger 
spill over to new situations and cause participants to act more prosocially in triadic 
situations. Interestingly, these effects could not be explained by trait anger and trait 
empathy. Study 3.4 elaborated on that and revealed that angry people prefer 
compensation of a victim to punishment of a perpetrator in a triadic situation. Finally, 
Study 3.5 explicitly showed that prosocial behavior is motivated by experienced anger 
and not solely by injustice.  
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We believe that these findings offer a significant contribution to the social psychological 
literature on anger and angry behaviors in that they are the first to show when anger 
motivates people to compensate or act prosocially towards the victim. We think that 
these prosocial consequences of anger have been overlooked in previous studies on the 
negative consequences of anger because these focused on dyadic situations; studies on 
prosocial behavior typically focus on triadic situations. Only when a person observes a 
certain inequitable situation can we observe prosocial behavior following from anger. 
When people themselves are victims of inequity, we primarily see antagonistic behavior 
because there is simply no victim to be compensated (unless one could compensate 
oneself). An additional reason for having overlooked prosocial consequences of anger 
could be the dominant theoretical focus on negative consequences of anger, most 
notably punishment. Previous studies that did look at positive or prosocial effects of 
anger were mainly correlational in nature, were inconsistent in the operationalization 
of anger (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Wakslak et al., 2007), or 
lacked a simultaneous measure of both compensatory and punitive measures (as in 
third-party punishment studies). Finally, studies that did include positive consequences 
typically did not directly measure situational, state anger. For example, Leliveld et al. 
(2012) and Van Prooijen (2010) looked at prosocial consequences after injustice but did 
not include a measurement of anger. Deffenbacher et al. (1996) showed a positive 
correlation between trait anger and aggressive consequences, and Vitaglione and 
Barnett (2003) showed that there was no direct relation between trait empathic anger 
and helping or punishing. As has been shown for other emotions, such as shame, trait 
measures tend to yield different results than state measures of emotion (e.g., De Hooge 
et al., 2008). Effect of trait anger show what people do who are easily angered or who 
experience anger often. Effects of state anger show what people do who are angry about 
a specific situation.  
 
By linking anger to prosocial behavior we do not propose that anger is a prosocial 
emotion, neither do we suggest that there are two different forms of anger, or that anger 
leads to a general tendency to act prosocial to anyone or in every situation. Instead, we 
merely argue that there are situational distinctions in the experience of anger allowing 
for certain behaviors to emerge. Prosocial behavior can only emerge when there is room 
for compensatory behavior towards the victim and not only punitive behavior towards 
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the perpetrator (as reflected in the difference between triadic situations and dyadic 
situations). Furthermore, there are several terms in the anger literature that in general 
refer to the same construct as the one that we called third-party anger. For example, 
Batson et al. (2007) differentiate between moral outrage (anger provoked by the 
perception that a moral standard has been violated), personal anger (anger one might 
feel when one’s own interests are thwarted), and empathic anger (when interests of the 
cared-for other have been thwarted). First-party anger is what Batson et al. would call 
personal anger, and third-party anger is what they would call empathic anger when it 
concerns cared-for others such as friends, and moral outrage when it concerns 
strangers. As argued before, we do not believe that the experiences of anger are different 
between first-party or third-party anger, but rather its behavioral consequences are 
because the specific situations allow for different solutions. Studies that did concern 
behavioral consequences of moral outrage (O’Mara, Jackson, Batson, & Gaertner, 2011; 
Montada & Schneider, 1989; Wakslak et al., 2007) or empathic anger (Vitaglione & 
Barnett, 2003) all involved situations that we would call third-party anger situations. 
Finally, as discussed previously and shown in our studies, the positive effects of anger 
cannot be explained by simultaneous experiences of empathic concern.  
 
In addition to finding a direct relation between anger and prosocial behavior, we even 
found that angry people prefer compensation to punishment. Compensation could be 
seen as a more efficient form of restoring equity than punishment is, as it allows for 
getting the victim out of its disadvantageous position. Punishment, on the other hand, 
only lowers the perpetrator’s position to that of the victim, but does not do anything for 
the victim. However, there is also a possibility that people prefer compensation to 
punishment due to relational concerns. In contrast to punishment, compensation allows 
for investing in a relationship with the victim. Future research might reveal the exact 
motivation behind this preference.  
 
We do realize that our studies do not comprise actual behavior but hypothetical 
situations. Still, we believe these studies are important, as they are an initial test of the 
argument that anger can lead to prosocial behavior. Furthermore, anger is commonly 
judged to be a negative emotion, but our participants still indicated that they would 
choose the prosocial option. Finally, as shown by Fehr and Gächter (2002), people are 
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likely to perform actual punitive behavior after injustice, which makes it very likely that 
people would also perform actual compensatory behavior if the option had been given. 
Taken together, we sought to comprehend the behavioral effects of anger, and how 
situational factors decide why anger leads to antagonistic behavior towards the 
perpetrator or prosocial behavior towards the victim. These studies suggest that the 
behaviors stemming from anger, be it antagonistic or prosocial, are a situation-specific 
reaction to inequity. 
  




Emotions experienced in Studies 3.2 to 3.5 
Table 3.1 
























Note. One participant did not complete the emotion measure. Emotions could 
range from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly). Means with a different subscript differ 
significantly with all ts > 2.10, ps < .038. Means in bold represent the dominant emotion 
experienced within that condition, with all ts > 4.85, ps < .001 in the third-party anger 
















(n = 66) 
 
M (SD) 
 Anger 5.40 (1.01)a 
 
5.39 (1.02)a 
 Guilt 1.97 (1.46)a 2.73 (1.87)b 
Shame 2.38 (1.73)a 3.06 (1.95)b 
Regret 2.23 (1.81)a 3.17 (2.05)b 
Sadness 4.05 (1.96)a 4.82 (1.98)b 
Frustration 6.00 (.97)a 6.26 (.90)a 
Fear 2.89 (1.90)a 2.82 (1.80)a 
3








 Anger  
(n = 63) 
Control  







Anger 3.67 (0.92)a 
 
1.29 (0.74)b 
Guilt 1.67 (1.03)a 1.24 (0.60)b 
 
Shame 1.89 (1.06)a 1.29 (0.70)b 
 
Regret  2.08 (1.22)a 1.42 (0.79)b 
 
Sadness 2.57 (1.36)a 1.25 (0.71)b 
 
Happiness 1.25 (0.62)a 3.29 (0.95)b 
Note. Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means with a 
different subscript differ significantly with all ts > 2.84, ps < .006. Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts > 8.12, ps 
< .001 in the anger condition, and with all ts > 10.36, ps < .001 in the control condition.  
 
  
























Note. Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means with a 
different subscript differ significantly with all ts > 3.85, ps < .001. Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts > 2.84, ps 






(n = 95) 
 
Control  
(n = 97) 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 2.53 (1.17)a 1.07 (0.36)b 
Guilt 2.05 (1.20)a 1.26 (0.70)b 
Shame 1.67 (1.02)a 1.22 (0.56)b 
Regret 1.53 (0.85)a 1.39 (0.76)a 
Pride 1.36 (0.74)a 2.81 (1.32)b 
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Note. Emotions could range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means with a 
different subscript differ significantly with all ts > 2.55, ps < .012. Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts > 11.53, 
ps < .001 in the injustice-friend condition, and with all ts > 13.07, ps < .001 in the 





Injustice friend  
(n = 104) 
 
Injustice stranger  
(n = 107) 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 8.33 (1.99)a 6.80 (2.85)b 
Guilt 2.91 (2.99)a 1.91 (2.74)b 
Shame 2.31 (2.95)a 2.29 (2.93)a 
Regret 4.59 (3.14)a 2.39 (2.74)b 
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This chapter is based on: Van Doorn, J., Breugelmans, 
S. M., & Zeelenberg, M. (2014). An equity perspective on 
anger and prosocial behavior. Manuscript under review.
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This chapter investigates an equity perspective on prosocial effects of anger. Five 
studies tested the idea that third-party anger only leads to prosocial behavior when it 
serves the goal of restoring equity. Studies 4.1 and 4.2 found that prosocial behavior 
towards a victim decreased when equity had already been restored by compensation of 
the victim. Study 4.3 added that the subjective experience of anger also decreases when 
equity is restored. Study 4.4 generalized the effects to different types of compensation. 
Study 4.5 switched to the perspective of the victim, and showed a larger decrease in 
anger when equity was restored by means of compensation than by punishment. The 
implications of these findings for the nature of anger and its relation with prosocial 
behavior are discussed.  
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An Equity Perspective on Anger and Prosocial Behavior 
 
Anger is a moral emotion; anger and moral outrage motivate people to behave in ways 
that have positive consequences for society (e.g., Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Kahneman, 
Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Smith, 1759; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). 
Traditionally, the moral nature of anger has been studied through third-party 
punishment: anger motivates people to punish those who inflict harm upon others (e.g., 
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). However, recent studies have 
shown that in such third-party situations people prefer to compensate victims over of 
punishing perpetrators (e.g., Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 
2012; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). In a recent literature review, 
Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2014) have discussed the evidence for third-
party anger leading to compensation. They have put forward an equity perspective to 
explain why these effects occur. This paper presents five studies that test the 
predictions following from an equity explanation of third-party anger effects.   
 
Equity theory is about perceptions of fair or unfair exchanges within interpersonal 
relationships in order to explain relational satisfaction (Adams 1965). Inequity can 
result in an unpleasant emotional state such as anger (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 
1998). When people experience anger due to inequity, equity can be restored by 
punitive, antagonistic behavior (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 
2003; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Roseman, 
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Van Coillie & Van Mechelen, 2006). By lowering the outcomes of 
the perpetrator through punishment or other forms of retaliation, the relationship is 
equitable again. People can also experience anger over events that befall other people. 
In such cases third-party anger equity can be restored by punishing the perpetrator but 
also by prosocial behaviors such as compensating the victim (for examples of 
compensation, see Darley & Pittman, 2003; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lotz et al., 
2011; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003; Wakslak et al., 2007).  
 
Translating the equity perspective on anger to emotion theory would mean that we 
posit equity to be the central concern of anger in interpersonal situations. According to 
Frijda (1988, p. 351): “Emotions arise in response to events that are important to the 




individual's goals, motives, or concerns. Every emotion hides a concern, that is, a more 
or less enduring disposition to prefer particular states of the world.” By understanding 
its central concern, we can delineate when an emotion should lead to goal-directed 
behavior and when not (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). The 
central concern in anger is the obstruction of a desired goal or need (e.g., Berkowitz & 
Harmon-Jones, 2004; Frijda, 1986; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boek, 2003; 
Scherer, 1984, 1993). Thus, behavior following from anger can be understood as 
striving to remove the obstruction and attain the desired goal. In interpersonal 
situations, when the goal is blocked by an actor instead of a state of the world (such as a 
broken car), the general concern of goal blockage takes the form of the more specific 
concern for equity or just relations (e.g., Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008; 
Scherer, 1984; Van Doorn et al., 2014; see also Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973).  
 
One consequence of an equity perspective is that anger should only occur when equity 
is violated, and that it should dissipate when equity is restored by a third party (as one’s 
anger and behavior that deal with the concern are no longer necessary). We would thus 
expect that anger will only lead to prosocial behavior when such behavior can serve the 
goal of restoring equity. This reasoning resonates research on other emotions such as 
guilt – an emotion that is also focused on remaining relationships equitable (Nelissen, 
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2013).  For example, De Hooge (2012) found that when a 
third party repairs the damage caused to a victim, the perpetrator's feelings of guilt as 
well as associated prosocial behaviors decreased. Another example on punishment can 
be found in Van de Calseyde, Keren, and Zeelenberg (2013), who revealed that people 
would punish identical transgressions less severely when victims are insured as 
opposed to uninsured (i.e., the harm done to a victim was restored by the insurance 
company). Moreover, Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock (1999) have shown that anger 
primed by injustice led to increasingly punishment judgments of other wrongdoers only 
when the perpetrator of the crime went unpunished. Thus, it seems that when the goal 
of restoring equity is attained (i.e., the central concern is acted upon) emotional 
experiences and ensuing behavioral consequences decrease (i.e., control-precedence of 
this behavior is not needed anymore). 
 
4




It should be noted that there are other perspectives on the behavioral consequences of 
anger in interpersonal situations. One famous example is Berkowitz’ (1990) cognitive 
neoassociationistic theory, which implies that the likelihood that a barrier to goal 
attainment will give rise to an aggressive response depends on the aversiveness of the 
event. Thus, frustrations give rise to anger and aggressive inclinations to the extent that 
they are judged as aversive or unpleasant. Another example is an attribution 
perspective to anger (e.g., Weiner, 2006; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988), which 
entails that when we attribute blame to an anger-eliciting person, this might lead to 
punitive behaviors towards the blamed person or prosocial behaviors towards others 
whom we do not blame. Both perspectives would lead to different predictions than an 
equity perspective. For example, an equity perspective leads to the predictions that only 
victims of inequity should be compensated and not just any needy person in an anger 
situation, and that prosocial compensation should diminish when inequity has been 
restored by a third party (e.g., an insurance company). 
 
Thus, in this paper we examine whether an equity perspective can explain the prosocial 
effects of anger. Our general hypothesis is that third-party anger only leads to prosocial 
behavior when it serves the goal of restoring equity. When equity has already been 
restored by another party, the equity concern has been satisfied, leading to a decrease 
in feelings of anger and associated prosocial behaviors towards the victim. This general 
hypothesis was tested in a series of five studies. In the first two studies we show that 
third-party prosocial behavior following anger decreases when equity was already 
restored by compensating the victim (Study 4.1) or by punishment of the perpetrator 
(Study 4.2). Study 4.3 adds that the experienced anger decreases as well. Study 4.4 
shows that these effects generalize to different types of compensation. Finally, Study 4.5 
switches to a victim’s perspective, showing a larger decrease in anger when equity was 
restored via compensation than via punishment.  
 
  




Study 4.1: Equity Restoration by Compensation 
 
Method7 
One hundred and thirty-two Tilburg University students (99 females; Mage = 20.80, SD = 
2.60) were randomly assigned to an inequity, compensated inequity or control 
condition. In both the inequity and compensated inequity condition participants read 
the following scenario (adopted from Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008): 
A friend of yours, Tim, just bought a new bicycle that took him three years to 
save for. He goes to the supermarket with his new bicycle to do some shopping, 
and puts his bicycle in front of the supermarket. When he comes back from the 
supermarket he sees that his bicycle got stolen. He can see the thief cycling away 
with his bicycle, however, having his hands full with his purchases Tim is unable 
to get his bicycle back.  
 
In the control condition, participants read: 
A friend of yours, Tim, just bought a new bicycle that took him three years to 
save for. He goes to the supermarket with his new bicycle to do some shopping, 
and puts his bicycle in front of the supermarket. When he comes back from the 
supermarket he takes his bicycle and cycles home with his purchases. 
 
Participants then indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt they would 
feel in the described situation (1 = not at all; 5 = very strongly). Only participants in the 
compensated inequity condition subsequently read that Tim insured his bicycle, and 
that the insurance covers a new bicycle for him. Next, all participants read: “a week after 
this incident with the bicycle, it is Tim’s birthday. You are also invited to his birthday.” 
Participants indicated how many euros they would spend on Tim’s birthday, as a 
dependent measure of prosocial behavior. Furthermore, only participants in the 
inequity and compensated inequity condition answered three questions about 
punishment of the bicycle thief: “How important is it to you that the thief will be 
caught?”; “How much would you like the thief to get punished?”; and “How important is 
it to you that the thief is paying for his deed?” on scales running from 1 (not at all) to 7 
                                                   
7 Studies 4.1 and 4.2 were part of a larger testing session. There were no gender effects in any of the 
experiments.  
4




(very much). Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and received €8 for their 
participation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Statistics can be found in Table 4.1. Participants in the inequity condition and the 
compensated inequity condition reported more anger than participants in the control 
condition. There was no difference in reported anger between the two inequity 
conditions. Participants in both inequity conditions reported more anger than other 
emotions.  
 
Participants in the inequity condition spent more euros on Tim’s birthday than 
participants in the compensated inequity condition and control condition8. These last 
two conditions did not differ. Analyzing the three punishment dependent measures 
separately yielded the same results as putting them together. Therefore, we computed a 
single mean score of these items (α = .84). Participants in the equity condition were 
equally likely to punish the thief as participants in the compensated inequity condition. 
 
In short, results show that when equity is restored (i.e., when the insurance company 
provided a new bike), people are less prosocial (i.e., spend less money on Tim’s birthday 
present) compared to when equity was not yet restored. The willingness to see the thief 
punished is equal in the inequity conditions. Therefore, in the next study we aimed to 
investigate whether the restoration of equity via punishment of the perpetrator would 
reveal similar results on prosocial behavior as in Study 4.1.  
                                                   
8 There were four extreme outliers (data points that are more extreme than Q1 – 3 * IQR or Q3 + 3 * IQR) 
on the prosocial behavior measure, which were all in the control condition. We chose not to delete these 
outliers, as we judged these responses as likely and valid, especially because these cases appeared in the 
same condition. Deleting these cases did not alter the effect: F(2, 125) = 13.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. 
Furthermore, a linear regression analysis revealed that age had a significant effect on prosocial behavior, 
β = .48, t = 6.23, p < .001. When entering age as a covariate in an ANCOVA with Condition as an 
independent variable and prosocial behavior as dependent variable, results remained the same: The 
ANCOVA showed a significant effect, F(2, 128) = 9.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. 
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Study 4.2: Equity Restoration by Compensation vs. Punishment 
 
Method 
One hundred and thirty-five Tilburg University students (113 females; Mage = 19.96, SD = 
3.68) were randomly assigned to an inequity, compensated inequity, punished inequity 
or control condition. Participants read the same scenarios and completed the same 
emotion check as in Study 4.1. Those in the punished inequity condition read that the 
police punished the thief. Participants then again indicated how much they would spend 
on Tim’s birthday present. Finally, they were thanked, debriefed, and received course 
credit for their participation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Statistics can be found in Table 4.2. Participants in all three inequity conditions 
reported more anger than participants in the control condition. There was no difference 
in reported anger between the three inequity conditions. Participants in all three 
inequity conditions reported more anger than other emotions. 
 
Participants in the inequity condition spent most euros on Tim’s birthday, more than 
participants in the compensated inequity condition and than participants in the control 
condition. The amount of money spend in the punished inequity condition was 
somewhere in the middle and did not differ significantly from other conditions9. In the 
next studies we wanted to see whether, next to the motivation to act prosocially, the 
experienced anger would decrease after equity is restored.  
                                                   
9 There was one extreme outlier in the punished inequity condition on the prosocial behavior measure. 
We chose not to delete this outlier, for the same reason as stated in footnote 8. Deleting this case did not 
alter the effect: F(3, 130) = 3.70, p = .014, ηp2 = .08. Furthermore, a linear regression analysis revealed that 
age had a significant effect on prosocial behavior, β = .56, t = 7.67, p < .001. When entering age as a 
covariate in an ANCOVA with Condition as an independent variable and prosocial behavior as dependent 
variable, results remained the same: The ANCOVA showed a significant effect, F(3, 130) = 2.93, p = .036, 
ηp2 = .04. 
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Study 4.3: Equity Restoration and the Decrease in Anger 
 
Method 
One hundred and forty-nine students from Fontys University in Tilburg (107 females; 
Mage = 20.84, SD = 2.92) were randomly assigned to an inequity or compensated inequity 
condition. They read the same scenarios as in Study 4.1. As an emotion check, 
participants subsequently indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt 
they would feel in the described situation, on a slider scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 
10 (very strongly). Next, participants in the inequity condition read: “Tim never got his 
bicycle back”, whereas participants in the compensated inequity condition read: “Tim 
never got his bicycle back. However, Tim insured his bicycle and the insurance covers a 
new bicycle for him.” Participants then again rated how they would feel using the same 
questions. Next, all participants read that Tim’s birthday was coming up, and were 
asked how much they would spend. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Statistics can be found in Table 4.3. Directly after reading about the bicycle theft, 
participants in both conditions reported more anger than other emotions. There were 
no differences in emotion experiences between conditions. After reading about the 
current status of Tim’s bicycle (Tim never got his bicycle back or the insurance covers a 
new bicycle), participants in both inequity conditions still reported more anger than 
other emotions. But now there were between condition differences. Anger and regret 
were lower and pride was higher in the compensated inequity condition. Interestingly, 
when comparing the emotions at measure 1 and measure 2, anger feelings decreased 
significantly in the compensated inequity condition but not in the inequity condition. 
Participants in the compensated inequity condition also spent less euros on Tim’s 
birthday than participants in the inequity condition10. 
 
From this study it thus appears that when equity is already restored (the insurance 
company bought a new bicycle), both the experienced anger and the motivation to act 
                                                   
10  There were two extreme outliers in the compensated inequity condition on the prosocial behavior 
measure. We chose not to delete these outliers, for the reason stated in footnote 8. Deleting these cases 
did not alter the effect: t(104.55) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 0.75. 
 




prosocially decrease. It seems that when the relation is equitable again (the concern is 
acted upon), control precedence is not needed anymore and anger can diminish. In 
Study 4 we varied the form of compensation to the victim to study whether that 
influenced the experienced anger and the motivation to act prosocially.  
 
Study 4.4: Compensation by Insurance vs. Retrieval 
 
Method 
One hundred and fifty-eight students (78 females; Mage = 21.35, SD = 2.50) from 
different universities in the Netherlands were randomly assigned to a no compensation 
condition, the compensation by insurance, or the compensation by retrieval condition. 
They read the scenario from Study 4.1, and indicated how much anger, shame, regret, 
pride, and guilt they would feel in the described situation, on a slider scale ranging from 
0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Participants in the no compensation condition 
subsequently read: “Tim never got his bicycle back”. Participants in the compensation 
by insurance condition read: “Tim never got his bicycle back. However, Tim insured his 
bicycle and the insurance covers a new bicycle for him.” Finally, participants in the 
compensation by retrieval condition read: “Tim’s bicycle was found again and he now 
owns his own bike again.” Next participants rated their emotions again on the same 
scales and indicated how much they would spend on Tim’s upcoming birthday. Finally, 
participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Statistics can be found in Table 4.4. Directly after reading about the bicycle theft 
participants in all conditions reported more anger than other emotions, and none of the 
emotions differed between conditions at this point. After reading about the current 
status of Tim’s bicycle (stolen, covered by insurance, found back), participants in the no 
compensation condition and the compensation by insurance condition reported more 
anger than other emotions. Participants in the compensation by retrieval condition 
reported more anger than guilt, regret, and shame but not more anger than pride. 
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Interestingly, when comparing the emotions at measure 1 and measure 2, anger feelings 
decreased significantly in both the compensation by insurance condition and the 
compensation by retrieval condition, but not in the no compensation condition. The 
decrease in anger in the two compensation conditions did not differ. Participants in the 
no compensation condition spent more euros on Tim’s birthday than participants in the 
compensation conditions, which did not differ from each other11.  
 
We can conclude from this study that it does not matter what type of compensation the 
victim receives, as long as it can restore equity. In the next and final study we measure 
anger before and after equity restoration when oneself is the victim (i.e., a first-party 
anger perspective).  
 
Study 4.5: First-party Anger 
 
Method 
Two hundred and fourteen Tilburg University students (167 females; Mage = 20.01, SD = 
2.08) were randomly assigned to an inequity condition, the compensated inequity 
condition, or punished inequity condition. In all conditions participants read the bicycle 
theft scenario as used in Study 4.1 but then from a first-party perspective (i.e., 
participants had to imagine that their bicycle got stolen). As an emotion manipulation 
check, participants subsequently indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and 
guilt they would feel in the described situation, on a slider scale ranging from 0 (not at 
all) to 10 (very strongly)12. 
                                                   
11  There were three extreme outliers in the compensation by retrieval condition on the prosocial 
behavior measure. We chose not to delete these outliers, for the reason in footnote 8. Deleting these cases 
did not alter the effect:  F(2, 152) = 15.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .17). Furthermore, a linear regression analysis 
revealed that age had a significant effect on prosocial behavior, β = .24, t = 3.04, p = .004. When entering 
age as a covariate in an ANCOVA with Condition as an independent variable and prosocial behavior as 
dependent variable, results remained the same: The ANCOVA showed a significant effect, F(2, 154) = 
10.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. 
12 For reasons of clarity we recoded the original slider scales. The original slider scales scores ranged 
from 0 to 100, which we divided by ten.  
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Next, participants in the inequity condition read: “You never got your bicycle back”, 
whereas participants in the compensated inequity condition read: “You never got your 
bicycle back. However, you insured your bicycle and the insurance covers a new bicycle 
for you.”, and participants in the punished inequity condition read: “You never got your 
bicycle back. However, the police punished the thief.” As a second emotion check, 
participants again indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt they would 
feel in the described situation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Statistics can be found in Table 4.5. Directly after reading about the bicycle theft, 
participants in all conditions reported more anger than other emotions, and none of the 
emotions differed between conditions at this point, with the exception of regret13. After 
reading about the current status of the bicycle (stolen, covered by insurance, thief 
punished), participants in the inequity and punished inequity conditions reported more 
anger than other emotions. Participants in the compensated inequity condition reported 
more anger and pride than guilt, regret, and shame.  
 
When comparing the emotions at measure 1 and measure 2, anger feelings decreased 
significantly in all conditions, but the magnitude of this decrease was highest in the 
compensated equity condition as compared to the inequity and punished inequity 
conditions. The decrease in anger did not differ between these last two conditions.   
 
                                                   
13 We do not have a clear reason for why participants have a lower score on regret in the punished 
inequity condition, as participants from all conditions started with the exact same scenario before 
completing emotion measure 1. Because we judge this to be a coincidental result, we will not further 
discuss this. 
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We conducted five studies to investigate an equity perspective on behavioral 
consequences of third-party anger (Van Doorn et al., 2014). Our general idea was that 
third-party anger only leads to prosocial behavior when it serves the goal of restoring 
equity. We found support in favor of this idea in each of the five studies. Studies 4.1 and 
4.2 found that when equity was already restored, either by compensation of the victim 
(Study 4.1) or by punishment of the perpetrator (Study 4.2), the motivation to act 
prosocially towards a victim decreased. Study 4.3 showed that – next to prosocial 
behavior – also experiences of anger decreased after equity restoration. Study 4.4 
showed that these effects generalize to different types of compensation. Finally, Study 
4.5 switched to a victim’s (i.e., first party) perspective and showed a larger decrease in 
anger when equity was restored via compensation than via punishment.  
 
These results have consequences for our view of anger. First, these results demonstrate 
that anger can lead to prosocial behavior, suggesting that the view of anger as a negative 
emotion is too one-sided. Second, these results suggest that anger is an emotion with an 
equity-restoring goal. The present findings therefore constitute an important 
contribution to the anger literature. Emotions lead to behavior when the situation 
allows for dealing with the central concern of that emotion. In the case of interpersonal 
anger this entails an equity concern and, as appears from our results, is accompanied by 
an equity-restoring goal. When the goal of anger is satisfied (i.e., equity is restored), 
one’s anger and behavior that deal with the concern are no longer necessary and thus 
decrease.  
 
Interestingly, in Study 4.3 we observe a (non-significant) trend that punishment is less 
effective in restoring equity than compensation. From a first-party perspective (Study 
4.5) it might make sense for a victim to prefer compensation over punishment, because 
compensation has clear benefits for the victim whereas punishment does not. However, 
why would third parties rather see a victim getting compensated than a perpetrator 
getting punished? One reason could be that punishment still leaves the victim in a 
disadvantageous position, while compensation helps the victim out of the 
disadvantageous position. Punishing the perpetrator may also restore equity, but this 
4




only puts the perpetrator in a disadvantageous position and does not take away the 
harm done to the victim. Another reason could be that people are generally reluctant to 
do harm (Baron, 1995). They might therefore rather choose a positive act of restoring 
equity than a negative act. Future research might reveal the exact motivation behind 
this preference for compensation over punishment in third parties.   
 
Our studies could also have implications for prosocial behavior in practical settings, 
such as insurance, charity, and justice. First, in our scenarios we often use insurance as a 
compensation tool. It appears that angry people act less prosocially when a victim 
receives compensation from an insurance company. Therefore, people might not feel 
the need to act prosocially towards insured victims in cases where victims do need help. 
Some evidence for this idea can already be found in the research by Van de Calseyde et 
al. (2013). They found that that people recommend milder punishments for 
perpetrators when the victim was insured. Second, it might be beneficial for charities to 
signal that people’s contribution help to right wrongs: If people have the idea that there 
is no opportunity to restore equity with their behavior, they might not feel inclined to 
donate at all. Finally, these results also have implications for theories of justice and law. 
From our results it appears that both first parties and third parties judge compensation 
of a victim as more satisfying than punishment of a perpetrator, while punishment is the 
dominant justice-restoring device in tort cases.  
 
Some limitations of the present research need to be highlighted. First, in our studies the 
victim always received full compensation. That is, either the insurance company covers 
a new bicycle for Tim or the original bike that got stolen is found back again. In real life 
full compensation is less likely. For example, an insurance company typically 
reimburses the current value of what is stolen or damaged, and not the original costs. It 
would be interesting to investigate whether full compensation is needed, or whether 
partial compensation (i.e., an insurance company could choose to only cover half of the 
expenses of the stolen bicycle) would also lead to a decrease in anger and prosocial 
behavior. If a victim receives partial compensation, the position of the victim is still 
somewhat disadvantageous and might therefore not be judged as reaching the goal of 
restoring equity. The concept of compensation is that it should restore the concrete 
condition of the victim to what it was prior to the accident (Darley & Pittman, 2003). 




Second, we realize that our studies do not comprise actual behavior but hypothetical 
situations. Still, we believe these studies are important as they are an initial test of an 
equity perspective to explain prosocial effects of anger. Furthermore, other emotion 
research has convincingly shown that the effects in hypothetical situations generalize to 
actual behavior (e.g., De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Feinberg, 
Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014).  
 
To summarize, five studies suggest that third-party anger is an emotion with an equity-
restoring goal, meaning that anger can lead to prosocial behavior when an inequitable 
situation can be set right. When equity has already been restored by another party (i.e., 
the concern of anger has been satisfied), feelings of anger and prosocial behavior 
towards the victim dissipate.  
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Previous research suggests that in order to restore equity, people prefer compensation 
of a victim over the punishment of a perpetrator in third-party situations. It remains 
unclear, however, whether this preference for compensation over punishment is stable 
or specific to certain situations. In six studies the robustness of the preference for 
compensation over punishment in angry people is investigated. Results from all 
experiments showed that adjustments in the situation or in the behavioral options 








A Robust Preference for Compensation Over Punishment 
 
There are multiple ways to restore an inequitable or unjust situation. For example, one 
can punish a perpetrator or compensate a victim in order to restore equity. Research on 
anger following from inequity has shown that in order to understand when people opt 
for punishment or compensation it is crucial to differentiate between first-party anger 
(anger because you yourself were harmed) and third-party anger (anger because 
someone else was harmed; see Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014 for a 
review). In the case of first-party anger, there is often only the option to act 
antagonistically towards the person responsible for the harm; it is not possible to be 
prosocial towards oneself. In third-party situations, there is both the option to punish a 
perpetrator responsible for the harm done and compensating a harmed victim.  
 
Previous theory and research on third-party anger has predominantly focused on 
punishment following from anger (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Goldberg, Lerner, & 
Tetlock, 1999; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014). 
However, recent studies have reported that when an option of compensation was 
included people seemed to prefer this option over that of punishment (Chavez & 
Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). This finding raises the 
question to what extent the preference for compensation over punishment generalizes 
across situations. Therefore, in this research we investigate the robustness of the 
preference for compensation over punishment in third-party anger. 
 
It is important to study one’s behavioral preference after third-party anger for several 
reasons. First, and foremost, if compensation would indeed be structurally preferred 
over punishment this would have implications for the predominant view of anger as a 
punitive, antagonistic emotion (Van Doorn et al., 2014). Second, knowing the behavioral 
predisposition of angry people in third-party situations allows us to more accurately 
predict angry people’s behavior in social interactions. Causing harm by, for example, 
unfairness or injustice is a prime elicitor of anger (e.g., Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & 
De Boeck, 2003; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998), and anger guides our behavior 
in dealing with the caused harm (cf. Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 
2008). Finally, studying the behavioral preferences of people in anger eliciting 




situations can also teach us about how people try to resolve situations of inequity or of 
social transgression. This, in turn, is important for contemporary models of human 
cooperation beyond kinship ties (e.g., Nowak, 2006). Previous research has shown that 
human cooperation is best supported by repeated positive interactions with others 
(Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009). 
 
Before turning to our studies, we start with reviewing some reasons for why angry 
people could prefer compensation over punishment. Firstly, third-party compensation 
might be preferred over punishment because previous studies on third-party responses 
were conducted in a non-repeated setting (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz et al., 2011). 
However, when a perpetrator can be unfair repeatedly it might be more beneficial to 
punish the perpetrator to stop his or her unfair behavior. Indeed, deterrence of future 
offenses is one of the justifications for why people punish (Carlsmith, Darley, & 
Robinson, 2002).  
 
A second reason for preferring compensation over punishment could be that 
compensation is judged as having a greater contribution or as being more efficient than 
punishment, because punishment still leaves the victim in a disadvantageous position. 
In previous research were monetary compensation and punishment was used, both 
behavioral options were equally costly and had an equal influence on the total amount 
of money victims and perpetrators owned (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Leliveld, Van Dijk, 
Van Beest, 2012; Lotz et al., 2011). It might be the case that people only consider 
punishment when the efficiency of such a negative option is greater than that of 
compensation. People are reluctant to do harm and rather not act negatively if they can 
avoid it (Baron, 1995).  
 
Third and related to the previous reason, people might not be willing to punish 
themselves but might be inclined to choose punishment when performed by someone 
else. Research on self-other decision making has revealed that there is a difference in 
how individuals make a decision with a negative impact for themselves as compared to 
advising someone else about the decision (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Giving someone else 
advice about making a decision is more socially distant than making the decision 
yourself (Polman & Emich, 2011) and is judged as easier (Kray & Gonzalez). Hence, 
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people might be more inclined to choose punishment when performed by someone else 
if they do not have to bear the costs of punishment themselves.  
 
In the next six studies we have created a set of conditions to investigate these reasons 
and study the robustness of the preference for compensation over punishment. In 
Studies 1-3 we confronted people with a perpetrator who has a possibility to act 
unfairly multiple times, and asked whether participants want to use their own money to 
compensate the victim, punish the perpetrator, or whether they want to keep the money 
themselves. In Study 4 we made punishment more efficient than compensation, and in 
Study 5 we examine whether people might be reluctant to punish themselves, and 
prefer punishment if performed by someone else. Finally, in Study 6 we test a 
methodological constraint, namely whether people increase punishment when an 





Three hundred and eight MTurk-workers (170 males, 138 females; Mage = 31.86, SD = 
10.62) were randomly assigned to the single game condition or multiple games 
condition. Participants in the single game condition read the following scenario: 
Imagine: You observe a game played by Mark and Rick. In this game, $100 needs to be 
divided. Mark gets to decide how to divide this money between himself and Rick. Rick 
has no influence on the division of the money. Mark decides to give Rick $20 and to keep 
$80.  
 
Participants in the multiple games condition read the following scenario: 
Imagine: You observe a series of games played by Mark and Rick. In every game 
$100 needs to be divided, and in every game Mark gets to decide how to divide 
this money between himself and Rick. Rick has no influence on the division of the 
money. In the first game, Mark decides to give Rick $20 and to keep $80.  
 
                                                   
14 There were no gender effects on monetary choice in any of the studies.  




Next, as an emotion check, participants indicated how much anger, shame, regret, pride, 
and guilt they would feel in the described situation, on slider scales ranging from 0 (not 
at all) to 10 (very strongly)15. Then, participants read that they themselves owned $50, 
and that they could choose one of the three options to use the dollars they owned: They 
could compensate Rick; every dollar that they used for compensation would increase 
Rick’s amount with $3. They could punish Mark; every dollar that they used for 
punishment would decrease Mark’s amount with $3. Or they could keep the money 
themselves. In case of choosing punishment or compensation, participants also 
indicated how many dollars they would spend.  
 
Results and Discussion16 
Participants in the single game and multiple games conditions reported more anger 
than all other emotions after reading about the unfair distribution. Participants in both 
conditions experienced anger equally intense. 
 
The percentages of monetary choice are shown in Table 5.1. There was no difference in 
the choice for compensation, punishment, or keeping the money between conditions. In 
both conditions participants more often choose for compensation than for punishment. 
There were no differences in the amount of money spent on compensation between the 
single game condition (M = $18.26, SD = 12.93) and the multiple games condition (M = 
$19.45, SD = 11.87), t(102) = -0.49, p = .627.  
 
It thus appears that people are reluctant to punish when they have an opportunity to 
compensate a victim, even if a perpetrator might act unfairly again in the future. In the 
next study, adjusted versions of the scenarios used in Study 5.1 were used. It might not 
have been clear how many games Mark would play in the multiple games condition and 
that Mark could be repeatedly unfair. We also made it clear that the decision to let Mark 
decide was purely random.  
  
                                                   
15 In studies using a slider scale we divided the original scores (ranging from 0 to 100) by ten for reasons 
of clarity. 
16 Results for emotions in all studies are in the Appendix. 
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Monetary choice  
Single game 
(n = 153) 
 
Multiple games 




Compensation 31.4% 37.4% 
Punishment 7.2% 5.8% 
 
Keep 61.4% 56.8% 




(n = 67) 
Multiple games 
(n = 70) 
Compensation 56.7% 52.9% 
Punishment 7.5% 14.3% 
 
Keep 35.8% 32.8% 




(n = 100) 
Repeated fairness 
(n = 101) 
Compensation 39.0% 22.8% 
Punishment 20.0% 2.0% 
Keep 41.0% 75.2% 
 χ² (2, N = 201) = 29.32, p < .001 
 
  







One hundred and thirty-seven Tilburg University students17 (25 males, 112 females; 
Mage = 19.46, SD = 2.41) were randomly assigned to the single game condition or 
multiple games condition and received course credit for their participation. Participants 
in the single game condition read the following scenario: 
Imagine: You observe a single game played by Mark and Rick in which €100 needs to be 
divided. By the toss of a coin Mark is selected to decide how to divide this money 
between himself and Rick. Rick has no influence on the division of the money. Mark 
decides to give Rick €20 and to keep €80.  
 
Participants in the multiple games condition read the following scenario: 
Imagine: You observe a series of 20 games played by Mark and Rick, and in every 
game $100 needs to be divided. By the toss of a coin Mark is selected to decide 
how to divide this money between himself and Rick in every game. Rick has no 
influence on the division of the money. In the first game, Mark decides to give 
Rick €20 and to keep €80.  
 
As an emotion check, participants subsequently indicated how much anger, shame, 
regret, pride, and guilt they would feel in the described situation (1 = not at all, 5 = very 
strongly). Then as in Study 5.1, participants read that they themselves owned €50, and 
that they could choose to compensate Rick, to punish Mark, or they could keep the 
money themselves. All participants were asked to think carefully about how to use their 
€50. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the single game and multiple games conditions reported more anger 
than all other emotions after reading about the unfair distribution. Participants in both 
conditions experienced anger equally intense. 
 
                                                   
17 An additional three participants were excluded from the analyses because they failed to follow the 
instructions. 
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The percentages of monetary choice are shown in Table 5.1. There was no difference in 
the choice for compensation, punishment, or keeping the money between conditions. In 
both conditions participants more often choose for compensation than for punishment. 
There were no differences in the amount of money spent on compensation between the 
single game condition (M = €18.50, SD = 10.76) and the multiple games condition (M = 
€17.78, SD = 10.21), t(72) = 0.29, p = .770.  
 
From these results we can conclude that when a perpetrator could be repeatedly unfair, 
people are still reluctant to punish and prefer to compensation over punishment. In the 
next study, we again adjusted the scenario and confront participants with Mark acting 
unfairly multiple times. We also adjusted to whom the unfairness was done. Participants 
might have chosen to compensate the victim, because Mark could harm the same victim 





Two hundred and one MTurk-workers (112 males, 89 females; Mage = 33.65, SD = 11.01) 
were randomly assigned to the repeated unfairness condition or repeated fairness 
condition. Participants in the repeated unfairness condition read the following scenario: 
Imagine: You observe a series of 10 games played by Mark, and among others, 
Tim, Michael and Rick. In every game $100 needs to be divided. By means of a 
coin flip it is decided that Mark gets to divide the money between himself and the 
other player. The other player has no influence on the division of the money. In 
the first game, Mark decides to give Tim $20 and to keep $80. In the second 
game, Mark decides to give Michael $10 and to keep $90. In the third game, Mark 
decides to give Rick $20 and to keep $80. Thus, Mark always keeps the greater 
part of the money and gives a small part to the other player.  
 
Participants in the repeated fairness condition read the same scenario, but instead of an 
unequal distribution, Mark divided the money between himself and the other players 
equally. Next,  as an emotion check, all participants subsequently indicated how much 




anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt they would feel in the described situation, on 
slider scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly).  
 
Next, participants read that: 
Shortly, Mark will play a fourth game with Daniel. You own $50 in this fourth 
game. How would you spend the $50 as an observer of this game? You have three 
options to spend each dollar: You can compensate Daniel; every dollar that you 
use for compensation will increase Daniel’s amount with $3. You can punish 
Mark; every dollar that you use for punishment will decrease Mark’s amount 
with $3. Or you can keep the money.  
 
In the repeated unfairness condition, participants subsequently read: “In the fourth 
game, Mark decides to give Daniel $20 and to keep $80.” In the repeated fairness 
condition, participants read: “In the fourth game, Mark decides to give Daniel $50 and to 
keep $50.” Finally, participants were asked which option (punishment, compensation, 
or keeping the money) they would choose. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the repeated unfairness condition experienced more anger than 
participants in the repeated fairness condition.  Participants in the repeated unfairness 
condition reported more anger than all other emotions.  
 
The percentages of monetary choice are shown in Table 5.1. Participants in the repeated 
unfairness condition more often chose for punishment and compensation than 
participants in the repeated fairness condition, whereas participants in the latter 
condition more often chose to keep the money. In both conditions participants more 
often choose for compensation than for punishment. There were no differences in the 
amount of money spent on compensation between the repeated unfairness condition (M 
= $28.87, SD = 14.50) and the repeated fairness condition (M = $23.43, SD = 15.95), 
t(59) = 1.37, p = .177.  
 
In the next study we varied the contribution of the punishment and compensation. 
Participants read that either the contribution of compensation and punishment would 
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be equal or unequal. In the unequal condition, the contribution of punishment would be 
greater than compensation. This difference might motivate people to actually choose 





Two hundred and two MTurk-workers (138 males, 64 females; Mage = 31.28, SD = 9.33) 
were randomly assigned to the equal contribution condition or unequal contribution 
condition. All participants read the same scenario as the one used in the single game 
condition of Study 5.1, where Mark decides to give Rick $20 and to keep $80, and 
completed the same emotion check.  
 
Next, participants in the equal contribution condition read that they themselves owned 
€50, and that they could choose one of the three options to use the dollars they owned: 
They could compensate Rick. Every dollar that they used for compensation would 
increase Rick’s amount with $3; or they could punish Mark. Every dollar that they used 
for punishment would decrease Mark’s amount with $3; or they could keep the money 
themselves. In the unequal contribution condition participants read that that they 
themselves owned $50, and that they could choose one of the three options to use the 
dollars they owned: They could compensate Rick. Every dollar that they used for 
compensation would increase Rick’s amount with $1; or they could punish Mark. Every 
dollar that they used for punishment would decrease Mark’s amount with $3; or they 
could keep the money themselves.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the equal contribution and the unequal distribution conditions reported 
more anger than all other emotions after reading about the unfair distribution. 
Participants in both conditions experienced anger equally intense. 
 
The percentages of monetary choice are shown in Table 5.2. Participants in the equal 
contribution condition more often chose for compensation and also spent more on 
compensation (M = $17.94, SD = 11.52) than participants in the unequal contribution 




condition (M = $26.78, SD = 14.35), t(67) = -2.83, p = .006. In both conditions 
participants more often choose for compensation than for punishment. However, in the 
unequal contribution condition participants chose more often for keeping the money 
themselves than for compensation.  
 
In the next study we investigate whether people are reluctant to punish themselves, but 
might still judge punishment effective if performed by someone else. Therefore, in what 
follows either participants themselves were responsible for deciding how to spend the 











Monetary choice  
Equal contribution 
(n = 101) 
Unequal contribution 
 (n = 101) 




Keep 50.5% 61.4% 













Three hundred and three MTurk-workers (161 males, 142 females; Mage = 31.98, SD = 
10.71) were randomly assigned to the third-party decision condition, fourth-party own 
decision or fourth-party other decision condition. All participants read the same 
scenario as the one used in the single game condition of Study 5.1, where Mark decides 
to give Rick $20 and to keep $80, and completed the same emotion check, with the small 
adjustment that participants in the third-party decision condition read that they 
observed this game between Mark and Rick and participants in the two fourth-party 
conditions read that they and another person observed the game between Mark and 
Rick.  
 
As in previous studies, participants (alone or together with the other person) read that 
they owned $50 and that they could choose one of the three options to use the dollars 
they owned: They could compensate Rick. Every dollar that they used for compensation 
would increase Rick’s amount with $3; or they could punish Mark. Every dollar that they 
used for punishment would decrease Mark’s amount with $3; or they could keep the 
money themselves. In the third-party decision condition, participants were asked which 
option they would choose. In the fourth-party own decision condition, participants 
subsequently read that they were the person responsible for choosing one of the above 
stated choices, and were asked which option they would choose. In the fourth-party 
other decision condition participants subsequently read that the other person was 
responsible for deciding how to spend the $50 and were asked how they would like to 
other person to spend the $50.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in all conditions reported more anger than all other emotions after reading 
about the unfair distribution. Participants in all conditions experienced anger equally 
intense. 
 
The percentages of monetary choice are shown in Table 5.3. There was no difference in 
the choice for compensation, punishment, or keeping the money between conditions. In 




all conditions participants more often choose for compensation than for punishment. 
There were no differences in the amount of money spent on compensation, F(2, 110) = 
2.56, p = .082, ηp2 = .044. Participants in the third-party decision condition (M = $17.87, 
SD = 9.94) spend an equal amount of money on compensation as participants in the 
fourth-party own decision condition (M = $22.19, SD = $14.71), p = .358, and the fourth-
party other decision condition (M = $24.79, SD = 15.35), p = .068. 
 
In the next study we wanted to see when people only have the option to do something 
(punish) or do nothing (keep the money themselves), whether they would prefer the 
active option (although it is a negative one). Anger is judged as an approach-related 
affect (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), and centers around restoring equity. Hence, if 
people only have the option to punish as the active response, they might be inclined to 





Study 5.5: Percentages of Monetary Choice as a Function of Condition  
 




Monetary choice  
Third-party 
decision 
(n = 98) 
Fourth-party 
own decision 




(n = 101) 
 
Compensation 38.8% 34.6% 39.6% 
Punishment 8.2% 9.6% 10.9% 
Keep 53.1% 55.8% 49.5% 













Two hundred and four MTurk-workers (130 males, 74 females; Mage = 31.74, SD = 9.21) 
were randomly assigned to the two options (punishment/keeping the money) condition 
or three options (punishment/compensation/keeping the money) condition. All 
participants read the same scenario as the one used in the single game condition of 
Study 5.1, where Mark decides to give Rick $20 and to keep $80, and completed the 
same emotion check.  
 
Next, participants in the two options condition read that they themselves owned $50, 
and that they could choose one of the two options to use the dollars they owned: They 
could punish Mark. Every dollar that they used for punishment would decrease Mark’s 
amount with $3; or they could keep the money themselves. In the three options 
condition participants read that that they themselves owned $50, and that they could 
choose one of the three options to use the dollars they owned: They could compensate 
Rick. Every dollar that they used for compensation would increase Rick’s amount with 
$3; or they could punish Mark. Every dollar that they used for punishment would 
decrease Mark’s amount with $3; or they could keep the money themselves.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the two options and the three options conditions reported more anger 
than all other emotions after reading about the unfair distribution. Participants in both 
conditions experienced anger equally intense. 
 
The percentages of monetary choice are shown in Table 5.4. Participants in the two 
options condition more often chose for punishment and keeping the money than 
participants in the three options condition. Participants in the three options condition 
more often chose to compensate than to punish, whereas participants in the two 














Monetary choice  
Two options 
(n = 102) 
Three options 
 (n = 102) 




Keep 84.3% 58.8% 







In six studies we investigated the robustness of the preference for compensation over 
punishment in angry people. Studies 5.1 to 5.3 showed that when a perpetrator can be 
or is unfairly repeatedly to one or multiple victims, angry participants still prefer 
compensation of a victim over punishment of the perpetrator. Study 5.4 again shows 
that angry people prefer compensation over punishment irrespective of the 
contribution of punishment being greater than the contribution of compensation. In 
Study 5.5 we found that angry people prefer compensation over punishment when the 
act is performed by themselves as well as by others. Finally, Study 5.6 shows that when 
the option to compensate was absent the majority of angry people chose not to act. We 
consistently find a similar pattern of percentages in the choice for compensation, 
punishment, or keeping the money in the baseline condition that is present in almost all 
studies, namely the condition in which one victim receives an unequal amount of money 
from a dictator and where participants have the option to compensate, punish, or keep 
the money (please note that although these conditions are the same across studies, they 
are named differently). 
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Considering the amount of money that is spend to compensation and punishment, 
results are consistent with the choices participants make: When there is no difference in 
choosing compensation between conditions, there is also no difference in the amount of 
money spend on compensation. There was no possibility to compare the amount of 
money spend on compensation with the amount of money spend on punishment in our 
studies because of the low amount of participants actually choosing punishment.  
 
Why would there be such a robust preference for compensation? What we did not test 
here is that there may be considerations of effectiveness. Punishment only makes sense 
if there is a good-enough probability that the behavior of the perpetrator will change. 
Otherwise, compensation should clearly have precedence because its effectiveness is 
certain. Furthermore, although we increased the contribution of punishment in Study 4, 
and not that of compensation, one could still argue that the victim is in a 
disadvantageous position and people want to see it restored. In compensation the 
victim is helped out of his/her disadvantageous position; punishing the perpetrator may 
also restore the harm done, but this only puts the perpetrator in a disadvantageous 
position and does not take away the harm done to the victim. Finally, it might also be 
the case that compensation is preferred because of relational concerns (Haesevoets, Van 
Hiel, & Reinders Folmer, & De Cremer, 2014; Okimoto & Tyler, 2007), and a fear for 
retribution by the punished perpetrator. Compensation allows for investing in a 
relationship whereas punishment does not. Future research might reveal the exact 
motivation behind the robust preference for compensation over punishment.   
 
Although there is a clear preference for compensation over punishment in our studies, 
the percentage of people choosing to punish did increase in some situations. For 
example, in Study 5.3 people were angrier and more often chose to punish when they 
were confronted with a perpetrator that had acted unfairly repeatedly as compared to a 
perpetrator that had acted fairly repeatedly. Also in Study 5.6 we see an increase in 
punishment when the option to compensate is not given. Finally, in Study 5.4 we find 
that when punishment has a greater contribution, people less often choose for 
compensation. However, instead of seeing a larger total of angry people choosing for 
punishment, we see a larger total of angry people choosing to keep the money 
themselves. We also see a surprisingly large amount of participants choosing to 




compensate in the repeated fairness condition of Study 3, where there is not really a 
victim. It might be the case that people chose this prosocial option as it can be 
interpreted more as giving instead of compensating, and people derive pleasure from 
that. Furthermore, people might be reluctant to act negatively by taking away money or 
to be egoistic by keeping the money in a fair situation.  
 
When looking at the different acts, results show a clear preference for compensation 
over punishment. However, our studies also included the option not to act. When 
comparing the prosocial act with not acting at all results do not indicate a clear 
preference. The approach-motivated characteristics of anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 
2009) might especially be present in cases of first-party anger. Our results suggest that 
in cases of third-party anger this approach motivation is less present. A reason for this 
might be that people judge their act as interfering between other people’s business.  
 
We realize that our studies do not comprise actual behavior but hypothetical situations. 
Still, we believe these studies are important as they are an initial test of the robustness 
of the preference for compensation over punishment. Furthermore, the choice for 
punishment in our ‘imaginary’ studies might even be easier than in studies were real 
choices are made and real costs are involved. Without real costs involved in punishment 
in our studies we still find the robust preference for compensation over punishment. 
Hence, the preference we find in our studies will most likely be equally if not more 
strongly present in actual behavior (see also Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013). 
 
The results from our six studies have implications for how we see anger as an emotion. 
Anger has often been related to negative behavioral consequences such as aggression, 
antisocial behavior, and has been suggested to be the proximate mechanism behind 
punishment (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip et al., 
2014). Our results, however, suggest that even when punishment might be a more 
effective option, people consistently choose compensation instead. This implies that the 
anger is a more moral and prosocial emotion than has widely been believed, and 
underlines the importance of considering emotions in social interactions. 
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Furthermore, our findings also have implications in the domain of punishment. 
Punishment has often been the only option given to participants, especially in the 
context of economic games, which has made punishment the dominant response in 
cases of inequity, unfairness or norm violations (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; 
Goldberg et al., 1999; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2009, 
2014). Our results show that as soon as other behavioral options are included, such as 
compensation, that this dominant response of punishment shifts to a dominant 
preference for compensation or not acting at all. Both positive interactions with others 
and the fact that only a small amount of people choose to punish might be very effective 
in upholding cooperation (Frank, 2004; Rand et al., 2009). 
 
Finally, these results also have implications for justice and law. From our results it 
appears that third-parties prefer compensation of a victim over punishment of a 
perpetrator, while punishment is the dominant justice-restoring device in tort cases. 
This preference also holds when third parties do not have to indicate a preference 
themselves, but have to indicate how they would prefer someone to choose, which is 
similar to a third party advising a judge in dealing with injustice. If punishment is not 
the preferred manner in restoring equity or justice, a (severe) punishment might never 
match up to the contribution that compensation establishes in observers’ eyes.   
 
Taken together, our results show that angry people have a strong preference for 
compensation over punishment in order to restore equity. Although in some situations 
the percentage of people who want to punish the perpetrator does increase, the 
preference for compensation of victims seems to be a strong one. Even when 
punishment might refrain a perpetrator from acting unfairly again in the future, and 
even when punishment has a greater contribution in restoring equity than 
compensation does, the preference for compensation remains. These findings imply that 
angry people prefer a prosocial option over an antagonistic option which has 
implications for theories on punishment, emotions and law.   
  





Emotion Checks of Studies 5.1 to 5.6 
Table 5.1 





















Note. Emotions could range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means with 
the same subscript do not differ significantly, with all ts < 0.55, all ps > .585. Means in 
bold represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all 
ts(152) > 6.56, ps < .001 for the single game condition, and all ts(154) > 6.16, ps < .001 






Single game  
(n = 153) 
Multiple games 
 (n = 155) 
 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 5.17 (3.11)a 4.98 (3.14)a 
Guilt 2.91 (3.35)a 2.80 (3.08)a 
Shame 3.31 (3.28)a 3.31 (3.14)a 
Regret 2.93 (3.17)a 2.74 (2.95)a 
Pride 1.30 (2.27)a 1.23 (2.03)a 
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Note. Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means with 
the same subscript do not differ significantly, with all ts < 1.94, all ps > .054. Means in 
bold represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts(66) 
> 2.39, ps < .020 for the single game condition, and all ts(69) > 4.77, ps < .001 for the 







Single game  
(n = 67) 
Multiple games 
 (n = 70) 
 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 2.48 (0.99)a 2.49 (0.94)a 
Guilt 2.07 (1.20)a 1.71 (0.97)a 
Shame 1.70 (0.94)a 1.57 (0.75)a 
Regret 1.63 (1.01)a 1.39 (0.64)a 
Pride 1.13 (0.46)a 1.31 (0.75)a 


























Note. Emotions could range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means with a 
different subscript differ significantly, with all ts > 3.29, ps < .001. Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, all ts(99) > 6.56, ps 
< .001 for the repeated unfairness condition, and all ts(100) > 3.20, ps < .002 for the 





(n = 100) 
Repeated fairness 
 (n = 101) 
 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 5.58 (3.23)a 1.90 (2.66)b 
Guilt 2.42 (3.01)a 0.89 (1.61)b 
Shame 3.04 (3.25)a 1.11 (2.14)b 
Regret 2.87 (3.00)a 1.56 (2.59)b 
Pride 1.33 (2.14)a 3.35 (3.26)b 
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Note. Emotions could range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means with a 
different subscript differ significantly, with all ts > 2.12, ps < .035. Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, all ts(100) > 4.67, 
ps < .001 for the equal contribution condition, and all ts(100) > 6.84, ps < .001 for the 






(n = 101) 
Unequal contribution 
 (n = 101) 
 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 4.65 (2.89)a 4.72 (3.23)a 
Guilt 2.70 (2.92)a 1.81 (2.85)b 
Shame 3.36 (3.23)a 2.42 (3.01)b 
Regret 2.44 (2.58)a 2.31 (2.80)a 
Pride 1.67 (2.19)a 1.01 (1.94)b 






Study 5.5: Means (and Standard Deviations) of Emotions Experienced as a Function of 
Condition 
 
Note. Emotions could range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means with 
the same subscript do not differ significantly, with all Fs < 0.93, p > .394. Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, all ts(97) > 4.02, ps 
< .001 for the third-party decision condition, all ts(103) > 6.32, ps < .001  for the fourth-









(n = 98) 
Fourth-party 
own decision 




(n = 101) 
 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD)  
Anger 4.54 (3.11)a 5.07 (3.10)a 5.05 (3.13)a 
Guilt 2.44 (2.94)a 2.41 (3.01)a 2.68 (3.28)a 
Shame 3.17 (3.34)a 3.15 (3.24)a 3.07 (3.45)a 
Regret 3.02 (3.20)a 2.62 (2.97)a 3.05 (3.29)a 
Pride 1.25 (2.15)a 1.16 (1.86)a 1.04 (1.97)a 
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Note. Emotions could range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means with 
the same subscript do not differ significantly, with all ts < 1.09, all ps > .279. Means in 
bold represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, all ts(101) > 
4.67, ps < .001 for the two options condition, and all ts(101) > 5.59, ps < .001 for the 







Two options  
(n = 102) 
Three options 
(n = 102) 
 
Emotions M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger 4.55 (3.07)a 5.01 (3.01)a 
Guilt 2.38 (2.97)a 2.53 (2.82)a 
Shame 3.06 (3.21)a 3.27 (3.20)a 
Regret 2.60 (2.90)a 2.64 (2.82)a 











This chapter is based on: Van Doorn, J., Zeelenberg, M., 
& Breugelmans, S. M. (2014). Anger appeals promote 
charitable donations. Manuscript under review.




This chapter investigates if and when anger appeals, communications that elicit anger in 
consumers, can be used to increase donations to charity. In an experimental study the 
idea was tested that anger leads to higher charitable donations, under the condition that 
people can restore equity with that donation (i.e., restore the harm done to the victim). 
Results indeed showed that when one’s donation serves a specific restorative function 
(i.e., compensate the suffering of these women so that they can start a new life) as 
compared to a non-restorative function (i.e., offer help in special crisis centers for 
women, to alleviate their suffering and not worsen their situation), angry participants 
donated more to charity. This difference was absent when people did not experience 
anger. Furthermore, angry people donated more to the restorative charity than people 
not experiencing this emotion. The effect of anger on charitable donations occurred 
independently from consumers’ empathic concern. These results thus suggest that 








Anger Appeals Promote Charitable Donations 
 
Emotional appeals are often used in advertising to persuade consumers to allocate their 
resources to some desired good; to buy a particular product or service or to donate 
money charity. Popular emotions in such appeals are fear and guilt (e.g., Hastings, Stead, 
& Webb, 2004; Hibbert, Smith, Davies, & Ireland, 2007; Witte & Allen, 2000), and 
sometimes regret (Landman & Petty, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). The idea 
behind emotion appeals is that by making consumers for example feel fearful, 
motivations to act on this emotion are activated. If the product offered by the advertiser 
then offers a way to satisfy these motivations consumers should be more inclined to 
acquire the product. Research has shown that making people afraid of dental pain can 
induce them to brush more often because they are motivated to avoid what they fear 
(e.g., Janis & Feshbach, 1953). Similarly, fund-raisers use guilt appeals and offer guilt-
reducing solutions to persuade consumers; depicting a sick, needy person in a charity 
fundraising ad may motivate people to donate money because they want to reduce their 
guilt over being better off (Hibbert et al., 2007; Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008). The 
research in this article focuses on the effects of another emotion that may be an 
important motivator of charitable giving, namely anger. Anger may be less readily 
thought of when thinking about motivating consumers to engage in constructive 
behaviors – indeed, it seems that anger appeals have never been used in persuading 
people. Yet, as we will outline below, there are good theoretical as well as empirical 
reasons to believe that anger appeals can effectively motivate prosocial behavior and 
that this influence is independent from that of other emotions.  
 
Anger and Prosocial Behavior 
 
Anger might have been overlooked as an emotion that can be used in persuasive 
communication because it is general thought of as an intense, negative emotion with 
only negative behavioral inclinations (such as aggression, antisocial behavior, and 
punishment; for a review, see Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014). However, 
anger can also have prosocial consequences such as compensating victims and helping 
the disadvantaged  (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Montada & Schneider, 1989; 
Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). These prosocial consequences mostly occur when 




anger is experienced in third-party situations – when people get angry over harm done 
to another person. 
 
Anger, like any specific emotion, is linked to specific concerns and goals (Bagozzi, 
Baumgartner, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2000; Frijda, 1988; Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; 
Wetzer, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007b; Yi & Baumgartner, 2004; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, 
Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). In third-party situations, anger is often a reaction to 
perceived violations of equity, such as when an unjust or unfair situation elicits an 
inequitable relation. Consequently, behaviors that are motivated by anger have the goal 
to restore equity (e.g., Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008; Scherer, 1984; see also 
Raihani & McAuliffe, 2012; Nasr Bechwati & Morrin, 2003). Inequity can be resolved by 
punitive, antagonistic behavior aimed at the perpetrator, but also by compensating the 
disadvantage of the victim. 
 
Studies have reported people engaging in compensatory behavior following experiences 
of anger. For example, Montada and Schneider (1989) studied the impact of various 
emotions on the readiness to engage in prosocial activities in favor of the 
disadvantaged. Participants were confronted with scenarios describing the problems 
and misery of different groups of people. Results showed that anger was a predictor of 
prosocial commitment (e.g., claiming support for the disadvantaged, blaming political 
and economic leaders, and the spending of money for charitable goals), and that it was 
even more so than existential guilt and sympathy. Another example can be found in Iyer 
et al. (2007) who showed that anger aimed at one’s own group predicted compensation 
toward the outgroup: American and British participants (ingroup) who perceived their 
countries to be responsible for illegitimate conditions in occupied Iraq (outgroup) 
reported more anger; anger, in turn, predicted action intentions to advocate 
compensation to Iraq.  
 
It is important to note that such prosocial effects of anger can occur independently from 
feelings of empathy. In other words, it is not the case that anger towards a perpetrator 
leads to punishment while co-occurring empathy towards a victim leads to 
compensation. Although empathy can lead to compensation (e.g., Bagozzi & Moore, 
1994; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Burch, 1981; Blader & Tyler, 2002; 
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Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2012), this effect is orthogonal to the effect of anger, 
which can incite both punishment and compensation. Evidence for this position can be 
found in Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, and Fetchenhauer (2011) who showed that 
regardless of whether or not victims knew they had been victimized, anger predicted 
participants’ compensation of the victim. The goal of empathy is to comfort someone, 
but if the victim does not know about the unfair allocation there is no one to comfort. 
Anger is independent of the victim’s knowledge because it reacts to the inequity of the 
distribution and hence can motivate compensation even in absence of such knowledge. 
A similar idea has been suggested by Blader and Tyler, who argued that both justice 
principles and empathy can lead to prosocial behavior. Justice theory suggests that we 
feel concerned even when a loathsome person for whom we feel little empathy is the 
victim of injustice and the emotion appraisal literature shows that injustice is an 
important elicitor of anger (Mikula, Scherer, Athenstaedt, 1998).  
 
When equity or justice is already restored the motivation to act decreases, in line with 
the goal-directed nature of anger. For example, research by Van de Calseyde, Keren, and 
Zeelenberg (2013) revealed that when a victim had already been compensated by an 
insurance company, consumers recommended less severe punishment for the criminal. 
Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock (1999) showed that anger elicited by injustice carried 
over to judgments of unrelated acts of harm only when a perpetrator went unpunished. 
These results suggest that when equity is restored, the need for punishment disappears. 
These findings imply that angry people only act if their actions can contribute to 
righting the wrong. Put differently, angry people only act when their behavior can still 
serve the goal of restoring equity. Thus, it can be expected that people also only act 




Emotional appeals can be used as a tool to persuade consumers. Such appeals have been 
shown to lead to attitudinal and behavioral change. For example, a meta-analysis 
revealed that fear appeals are an effective marketing tool when the advertisement or 
message is severe enough (Witte & Allen, 2000), although field research evaluations of 
fear appeals usually reveal that fear has weaker effects in real-world campaigns 




(Hastings et al., 2004). Guilt appeals have been extensively studied as well. For example, 
Coulter and Pinto (1995) found that advertisements with moderate levels of guilt were 
more effective than strong guilt appeals in influencing participants’ purchase intention.  
 
Outside of a traditional consumer context, emotional appeals have been shown to be 
effective in charitable fundraisings as well. Research on guilt convincingly showed that 
guilt can have interpersonal prosocial consequences towards victims (e.g., Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; 
Ketelaar & Au, 2003). In emotional appeal studies, guilt has been shown to induce 
higher donations, in relation to persuasion knowledge (knowledge of persuasion tactics 
and charities), agent knowledge (beliefs about the characteristics, competencies, and 
goals of the charity; Hibbert et al., 2007), a sense of responsibility (Basil, Ridgway, & 
Basil, 2006), and experienced empathy and self-efficacy (Basil et al., 2008).  
 
In light of the existing emotional appeals research it is surprising that anger has never 
been considered by fundraisers, especially in view of the observation that anger can 
induce compensatory behavior independently from empathic concerns in situations of 
third-party inequity. Bagozzi and Moore (1994) did find that exposure to an anti-child 
abuse public service advertisement induced anger, sadness, fear, and tension which in 
turn increased helping behavior. However, they did not study the separate effects of 
each emotion, leaving it in the middle what the specific contribution of anger on helping 
behavior was. The study of anger as a potential emotion appeal is important because 
many charities are aimed at people who are the victim of injustice or inequity. Anger 
motivates a goal to restore such justice or equity, and charities often deal precisely with 
this restorative goal.   
 
Anger as an Emotional Appeal 
 
Based on previous theory and findings it is predicted that anger leads to higher 
charitable donations, under the condition that people can restore equity with that 
donation (i.e., restore the harm done to the victim). If the donation does not serve a 
specific restorative function, angry people should not be inclined to donate more than 
people not experiencing anger. In the experiment reported in this paper empathic 
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concern was also measured so as to be able to assess the unique effect of anger. Two 
hypotheses were tested: 
 
H1:  Anger, independently from empathy, leads to more charitable giving when the 
donation serves a restorative goal. 
 
H2: Empathy, independently from anger, leads to more charitable giving irrespective of 





One hundred twenty-eight Tilburg University students (20 males, 105 females, 3 
unspecified, Mage = 19.50, SD = 2.22) were randomly assigned to an anger or a control 
condition. Participants first described a situation in which they felt angry (anger 
condition), or a regular day of the week (control condition). Such recalls are a common 
method of emotion induction (e.g., Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985). Recalling a 
situation in which an emotion was experienced reactivates this emotion and associated 
motivational tendencies. After the recall, participants indicated how much anger, 
happiness, shame, regret, sadness, and guilt they felt, on rating scales running from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (very strongly).  
 
Next, participants read about two different charities: OneMen, focused on repairing 
negative consequences of women who are victim of human trafficking, and Doctors 
Without Borders (DWB), focused on taking care of women who lost everything due to 
natural disasters. In the case of OneMen participants read: “With your contribution, 
OneMen will compensate the suffering of these women so that they can start a new life.” 
In the case of DWB participants read: “With your contribution, Doctors Without Borders 
will offer help in special crisis centers for women, to alleviate their suffering and 
prevent deterioration of their situation.”  
 
                                                   
18 There were no gender effects on the emotions and charity measures.  
 




Participants were asked to imagine that they had an extra €50 to spend this month and 
to indicate how much they were willing to donate to either of these charities, on a scale 
of €0 to €50 with intervals of €5. They also indicated which of the charities 
(OneMen/women trafficking or DWB/natural disasters) they found most important, 
and which of the charities’ goals they thought was most important (OneMen: 
compensation to women; DWB: offering help to women), both measured on a scale of 1 
(OneMen is most important) to 7 (DWB is most important) with the midpoint (4) being 
both OneMen and DWB are equally important. Participants then completed the 7-item 
empathic concern scale (α = .80; Davis, 1983, 1994). Finally, participants were thanked, 
debriefed, and received course credit for their participation.  
 
Results 
Means, standard deviations and relevant statistics are shown in Table 6.1. Participants 
in the anger condition reported more anger than participants in the control condition; 
within the anger condition, participants reported more anger than all other emotions. 
This pattern of results shows that the manipulation of anger was successful. 
Furthermore, univariate tests showed that participants in the anger condition donated 
significantly more to OneMen than participants in the control condition, but no such 
effect was found for donations to DWB. Within the anger condition, but not within the 
control condition, participants donated more to OneMen than to DWB19. Within the 
anger and control conditions, participants judged both charities and the goals they 
represent as equally important (as the means did not differ from the midpoint).  
 
We next tested whether donation intention could be explained by empathic concern. A 
regression analysis showed that empathic concern was related to the amount of money 
participants donated to both OneMen and DWB, β = .28, t = 3.22, p = .002 and β = .21, t = 
2.40, p = .018, respectively. When entering empathic concern as a covariate in ANCOVAs 
with Condition as an independent variable and donation intention to OneMen and DWB 
as dependent variables, the effects remain stable with F(1, 123) = 4.93, p = .028, ηp2 = 
.04 for OneMen, and F(1, 123) = 0.13, p = .722, ηp2 =  .001 for DWB. Thus, the increased 
donations in the anger condition cannot be explained in terms of empathic concern. 
  
                                                   
19 There were two missing values in the anger condition on the donation to DWB measure. 
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Study 6.1: Means (and Standard Deviations) of Emotions Experienced, Donation Intention, 
and Charity Importance as a Function of Condition 
 
 Condition    
 Anger  
(n = 64) 
Control  
(n = 64) 













Anger 3.30 (1.22) 1.33 (0.76) 10.99 .000 1.94 
Guilt 1.50 (0.78) 1.14 (0.39) 3.30 .001 0.60 
Shame 1.89 (1.16) 1.19 (0.53) 4.42 .000 0.78 
Regret  1.98 (1.22) 1.27 (0.51) 4.36 .000 0.76 
Sadness 2.84 (1.30) 1.34 (0.78) 7.91 .000 1.40 
Happiness 1.34 (0.72) 3.22 (0.95) -12.59 .000 -2.23 
 
Donation (€) 






OneMen  13.47 (11.69) 8.91 (9.94) 5.64 .019 .043 
DWB 10.73 (9.36) 11.09 (12.71) 0.03 .854 .000 
 
Importance 






Charity 3.64 (1.51) 3.86 (1.36) 0.75  .389 .006 
Goal of charity 4.25 (1.58) 4.19 (1.44) 0.06 .815 .000 
Note. Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means in bold 
represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts > 2.61, all 
ps < .011, ds > 0.33. Higher scores on the donation measures indicate higher amounts of 
euros donated to each charity. The mean in bold is the charity that is donated most to 
within the anger condition, t(61) = 2.07, p = .043, d = 0.26. There was no difference 
within the control condition: t(63) = -1.31, p = .195, d = -0.16. Scales of both importance 
measures ranged from 1 (OneMen is most important) to 7 (DWB is most important). 
Within the anger and control conditions, participants judged both charities and the 
goals the represent as equally important (as the means did not differ from the 
midpoint), ts < 1.91, ps > .061, ds < 0.24. 
 






This article presented a first empirical study of whether and when anger appeals lead 
consumers to donate more to charity. Results indicate that when a donation serves a 
specific restorative function (i.e., compensating suffering of these women so that they 
can start a new life) as compared to a non-restorative compensatory function (i.e., 
helping in special crisis centers for women, to alleviate their suffering and prevent 
deterioration of their situation), angry participants donated more to charity. This 
difference in donation intentions was absent when people did not experience anger. 
Furthermore, angry people donated more to the restorative charity than people not 
experiencing this emotion. These results suggest that anger can act as an appeal in 
soliciting charitable donations.  
 
It is important to note that the effect of anger was independent from that of goal 
importance and empathy. Although angry people donated more to OneMen (i.e., the 
restorative charity), they did not think that OneMen itself or the goals it represents 
were more important than Doctors Without Borders (i.e., non-restorative charity). In 
other words, people were not just inclined to judge a charity as more important because 
they just donated more to that charity. Anger-induced donations occurred 
independently from empathy-induced donations. Empathy predicted charitable giving 
to OneMen as well as Doctors Without Borders, whereas anger only lead to charitable 
giving in the case of OneMen. These results are in line with previous research suggesting 
independent prosocial effects of anger (e.g., Blader & Tyler, 2002; Lotz et al., 2011; 
Montada & Schneider, 1989).  
 
Apart from demonstrating the effects of anger appeals, our results also more broadly 
speak to the view of (third-party) anger as having an equity concern and an equity-
restoring goal (Stillwell et al., 2008; Scherer, 1984, Van Doorn et al., 2014; see also 
Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). Anger only led to a higher charitable donation 
when this could restore equity/justice. Showing prosocial consequences of anger of 
course does not imply that anger per se is a prosocial emotion; rather it means that 
prosocial consequences of anger are complementary to the negative and more well-
known antagonistic behaviors (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 
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2003; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Yi & Baumgartner, 2004) because both can serve 
the same goal.  
 
The results have important implications for fundraisers and charities, especially in the 
domain of injustice. Not only do these results suggest that inducing anger in potential 
givers might help in increasing donations, the results also suggest that charities should 
be aware of what information is given to potential givers. Charitable campaigns are 
usually occupied with how to ‘portray their victims’ (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 
2007), however, equally important for charitable campaigns is to be clear and 
informative about what goal is served with the raised money. As becomes clear from 
our experiment, the fact that the contribution of a donation is framed as either having a 
restorative function versus a non-restorative function has a large effect on the 
magnitude of the donation. An important next step for future research is to investigate 
whether these findings generalize to actual charitable campaigns.  
 
To summarize, anger appeals lead to higher donations when this serves a specific 
restorative function (i.e., compensating the victim and helping her out of her 
disadvantageous position). This effect occurs independently from that of co-occurring 



















In the introduction I talked about a contradiction in how anger is perceived by the 
different classic and contemporary theorists. It has been argued that it is bad to 
experience anger (a ‘poisonous’ emotion), while at the same time scholars have argued 
for the moral character of anger. While the negative view of anger might have been the 
most commonly accepted view of this emotion, in this dissertation I have emphasized a 
prosocial side of anger. More specifically, this dissertation explored the idea that anger 
can lead to prosocial behavior, and that the interpersonal behavioral consequences of 
anger can be understood from a central concern for equity. Let me below summarize the 
empirical findings presented in this dissertation and illustrate how our insights into 
anger progressed during the last few years.  
 
Overview of Findings 
 
Chapter 2 clearly demarcates the beginning of my research into the social nature of 
anger by providing a review of the empirical research at that time. I argued that the 
negative view of anger is too one-sided, as previous research and theorizing leads us to 
expect direct prosocial consequences from anger (i.e., prosocial behavior performed by 
the angry person themselves) in third-party situations (i.e., when observing that harm is 
done to someone else). It was further suggested that the antagonistic and prosocial 
consequences can be understood from the perspective that in interpersonal situations 
the behaviors stemming from anger are aimed at restoring equity.   
 
Chapters 3 and 4 were designed as a first test of the ideas that followed from the review 
in Chapter 2. The empirical research in these chapters was aimed at answering the 
questions whether and when anger leads to prosocial behavior. The results presented in 
Chapter 3 provided a first experimental demonstration of the direct prosocial 
consequences of anger in third-party situations, which can occur independently from 
empathic concerns that may be experienced simultaneously. From these results it also 
appears that people prefer the prosocial option over the antagonistic option, as they 
were more willing to choose or give money for compensation than punishment. Chapter 
4 more explicitly showed that the prosocial consequences of anger can be explained 
from an equity perspective, and proposed that anger is an emotion with an equity-
restoring goal. Results demonstrated that anger only leads to prosocial behavior 




towards a victim when the situation is inequitable. When equity has already been 
restored by another party, and the concern of anger has been satisfied, one’s feelings of 
anger and one’s own prosocial behavior towards the victim dissipate.  
 
Chapter 5 elaborated on a coincidental but consistent finding in Chapters 3 and 4, 
namely that people have a preference for compensation over punishment. The studies 
revealed that the preference for compensation over punishment in angry people is a 
robust one. Although some situational variations increased the choice for punishment, it 
never topped the choice for compensation. Even when punishment might refrain a 
perpetrator from acting unfairly again in the future, and even when punishment has a 
greater contribution in restoring equity than compensation, does the preference for 
compensation remain. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 presented a potential application of the prosocial consequences of 
anger in a consumer context. The study indicated that anger appeals can be used in 
eliciting higher charitable donations. Results showed that when one’s donation serves a 
specific restoring function (i.e., compensate the suffering of these women so that they 
can start a new life) as compared to a non-restoring function (i.e., offer help in special 
crisis centers for women, to alleviate their suffering and not worsen their situation), 
angry participants donated more to charity. For participants not experiencing anger, 
this difference was absent. Furthermore, angry people donated more to the restoring 
charity than people not experiencing this emotion. In line with results from Chapter 3, 
the effect of anger on charitable donations occurred independently from empathic 
concern, which predicted charitable giving irrespective of the specific restorative 
function.  
 
The studies combine a variety of methods that have been proven useful for studying 
emotions and their consequences in previous research. Of course, each method has its 
idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses, but as a set these different methodologies 
inform us about the prosocial consequences of anger. Although the studies do not 
comprise actual behavior but hypothetical situations, they do provide a first test of 
when and why anger leads to prosocial behavior. Furthermore, there are clear 
indications that anger will lead to prosocial behavior in real life. For example, anger is 
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commonly judged to be a negative emotion and there are no real costs involved in 
punishment in the hypothetical situations, but our participants still indicated that they 
would choose the prosocial option. Additionally, people are likely to perform actual 
punitive behavior after injustice, which makes it likely that they would also perform 
actual compensatory behavior if the option is given.  
 
In general the following can be concluded: (1) anger in third-party situations is 
experienced quite often, (2) in interpersonal situations anger is an emotion with an 
equity-restoring goal, (3) ways to satisfy this goal can include both antagonistic (i.e., 
punishment of a perpetrator) and prosocial behavior (i.e., compensation of a victim), (4) 
people prefer to restore equity by means of compensation, (5) the prosocial or 
compensatory behavior following from anger can be translated into higher charitable 
donations. Although the series of studies in this dissertation cannot provide us with a 
definite answer about the nature and function of anger, the results do paint a broader 
picture of anger.  
 
I do not dispute previous reasoning on anger. In fact, the results from this dissertation 
are in line with theories that anger involves negatives experiences, that it is about goal 
blockage, and that that behavioral tendencies can be predicted from the central concern 
of goal attainment. This dissertation adds that these behavioral tendencies are much 
more versatile than has generally been assumed; anger is an emotion that goes beyond 
punitive, antagonistic, and aggressive behaviors. The results in this dissertation can 
therefore best be summarized in the words of Carol Tavris (1989, p. 259): “Anger is 
good or bad depending on its use, not its nature.” This understanding of anger has 
important implications for anger in first-party and third-party situations and in 




This dissertation teaches us the importance of investigating anger not only in first-party 
(when you yourself are harmed) situations, but also in and third-party situations (when 
you observe that someone else is harmed). It also underscores the importance of 
including a diverse set of behavioral options for people to cope with their anger. The 




action tendencies of anger that have been identified by previous research appear to be 
antagonistic and self-oriented, which in many cases is true. In first-party situations, the 
most straightforward option to restore equity is to strike back. An option to act 
prosocially is often only present in third-party situations, where one can act towards a 
perpetrator and a victim. As the results from this dissertation highlight, including a 
prosocial option in the set of behavioral options in third-party situations has 
consequences for how people deal with transgressions in interpersonal situations. This 
is indicative of the behavioral repertoire of anger in real life, where the concerns that 
are relevant in anger can be served by many different behaviors. Failing to include these 
different behavioral options in research hinders progress as it does not allow for the 
richness of the anger response to manifest itself. 
 
The results from this dissertation are especially relevant for the domain of economic 
games, where punishment has been the dominant response in cases of inequity, 
unfairness or norm violations (e.g., Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2009, 2014). For example, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004) studied third-party sanctions of violations of a distribution norm in 
a dictator game. In such games there are dictators who determine a distribution of a 
certain amount of money between themselves and recipients who simply receive 
whatever dictators decide to distribute. Third parties observing this dictator game are 
then given the opportunity to (costly/altruistically) punish the dictator. In such games 
an additional prosocial option could have been offered as well. By having the possibility 
to compensate the recipient, punishment might become less of a dominant response in 
third parties. This would have consequences for the idea that third-party punishment 
can explain sustainable cooperation in society (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). The results in 
this dissertation suggest that when a prosocial option is included people will opt for 
that. Hence, third-party compensation might be a key motive for the explanation of 
cooperation as well. Frank (2004) already argued that only a small amount of people 
choosing punishment is necessary in upholding cooperation, and Rand, Dreber, 
Ellingsen, Fudenberg, and Nowak (2009) have shown that human cooperation is best 
supported by repeated positive interactions with others. 
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Related to the issue of punishment, this dissertation also has consequences for our view 
of anger as a moral emotion. Moral emotions are emotions that are linked to the 
interests or welfare of persons other than the self and that elicit prosocial action 
tendencies (Haidt, 2003). Anger has previously been classified as a moral emotion 
because it can be strongly felt both for the harm that is done to oneself as well as others, 
but not because of its behavioral consequences.  The antagonistic behaviors that follow 
from anger might lead people to think of anger as an immoral emotion. Although 
emotions that motivate helping behavior are easy to label as moral emotions, the 
antagonistic behaviors that follow anger are a part of its moral nature as well. The 
moral nature of anger lies in the fact that it leads people to care about the (social) world 
and to improve or restore that world. This dissertation shows that such restoring 
behaviors can be both antagonistic and prosocial, and that the prosocial behavior is 
even preferred by third parties. Hence, based on the disinterested elicitors as well as its 
consequences, this dissertation suggests that anger might be more of a prototypical 
moral emotion than has previously been assumed. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that anger can be felt for the harm that is done to others is unique. 
Of course, other emotions can also be experienced in third-party situations but these 
are often vicarious emotions. For example, when someone else makes a shameful 
mistake we can experience shame irrespective of how we behaved ourselves (Welten, 
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2012). Third-party anger, however, is the anger that results 
directly from what is done to someone else, and not on behalf of someone else (as in the 
case of vicarious emotions). In addition, Chapter 3 has demonstrated that first-party 
anger and third-party anger occur equally often, are felt equally intensely and both stem 
from perceptions of unfairness, which is less apparent from other specific emotions and 
their vicarious counterparts.  
 
Finally, this dissertation is relevant for theories on justice and law. From our results it 
appears that third-parties prefer compensation of a victim over punishment of a 
perpetrator, while our legal system is mainly focused on punishment. The preference 
for compensation over punishment might be relevant in explaining why people are 
often dissatisfied about punishments in the Netherlands (e.g., De Keijser, Van Koppen, & 
Elffers, 2007). Punishment might be judged as less effective because of high recidivism 




rates (Wartna et al., 2012), but it might also be the case that dissatisfaction regarding 
punishments is due to the fact that it does not help the victim out of his or her 
disadvantageous position. If punishment is not the preferred manner in restoring equity 
or justice, a punishment might never match up to the contribution that compensation 
establishes. Hence, people might be more supportive of alternative approaches to 




In elaboration on the previous paragraph, a next step would be to more explicitly study 
the rationale behind the preference for compensation over punishment in third parties, 
as found in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Why would there be such a robust preference for 
compensation? We have suggested several explanations in previous chapters, which 
deserve further studying. For example, it might be the case that people are generally 
reluctant to do harm (Baron, 1995). Another explanation might be that people judge 
punishment as less effective because punishment only makes sense if there is a good-
enough probability that the behavior of the perpetrator will change. They might also 
judge punishment as less effective because the disadvantageous position of the victim is 
not restored through punishment. It might also be the case that compensation is 
preferred because of relational concerns (Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). Compensation allows 
for investing in a relationship whereas punishment does not. Instead, punishment might 
elicit an intention for retribution by the punished perpetrator.  Elaborating on the 
rationale behind compensation and punishment could contribute to a better 
understanding of behavioral preferences in third parties.  
 
What would also add to the understanding of behavioral preferences in third parties is 
investigating people’s behavioral preferences in cases of low and high crime severity. In 
this dissertation, none of the offenses or transgressions were very severe, such as an 
unfair distribution of money, robbery, and attacks of senseless violence. It might be the 
case that the preference for compensation is only present in cases of mildly severe 
crimes, and that people prefer punishment in cases of severe crimes. For example, 
Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, and Scott (2004) have shown that in cases of severe crimes 
(e.g., forcibly removing someone from their car and stealing the car as compared to 
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stealing money from an ATM machine) people were punitive, regardless of threat to 
social order (whether conviction rates were high or low for that crime). Still, the harm 
done to the victim could increase with the severity of the crime as well. Hence, one 
could argue that compensation is still preferred in cases of severe crimes. However, 
more severe crimes also more often concern irrevocable harm. When one is unable to 
compensate the harm (such as in cases of rape or murder) punishment is the only viable 
option left. In cases of severe crimes with irrevocable harm such as rape, people might 
still be concerned with doing something for the victim even if direct compensation 
might not be possible. For example, research shows that people are accepting of taking 
into account the described consequences of a severe crime for the victim when 
determining the punishment of the offender (Lens, Van Doorn, Pemberton, & Bogaerts, 
2014).  
 
Another interesting avenue regards the different mechanisms of anger or empathy and 
prosocial behavior. Both in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 it was demonstrated that prosocial 
effects of anger remain after controlling for dispositional empathy (i.e., empathic 
concern). Although we see that empathic concern predicts compensation to victims and 
predicting higher charitable donations (as in line with other research on the prosocial 
consequences of empathy; e.g., Bagozzi & Moore, 1994; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, 
Buckley, & Burch, 1981; Blader & Tyler, 2003; Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2012), 
anger seems to take a different route towards the same prosocial outcomes. Although 
not tested in this dissertation, it seems to be the case that angry people are focused on 
the (inequitable) situation, whereas empathic and compassionate people are focused on 
the victim. That is why anger only leads to prosocial behavior when equity can be 
restored with that behavior, whereas empathic concern is a general predictor of 
prosocial behavior. Hence, I would predict that third-party anger only encourages 
prosocial behavior towards the harmed person (the victim of inequity) and not towards 
any needy person in the situation. In line with this prediction is research on guilt, which 
only leads to prosocial behavior towards the victim of inequity. This preoccupation of 
restoring the harm done to the victim leads to a negligence of others in the social 
surrounding (De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011). These ideas 
remain to be investigated though.  
 






This dissertation investigated when, why, and how anger leads to prosocial behavior. 
The results indicate that third-party anger can lead to prosocial behavior, and that this 
prosocial behavior is observed when one can restore equity with that behavior. By 
showing a more diverse set of behaviors stemming from anger than the well-known 
negative behaviors and by indicating why such behaviors emerge, the findings from this 
dissertation shed some new light on and extend the negative view of anger. It is time for 
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Er is iets vreemds met boosheid. Enerzijds wordt boosheid gezien als een negatieve 
emotie: Boosheid ontstaat door negatieve gebeurtenissen zoals onrechtvaardigheid, het 
is een negatieve ervaring en leidt tot negatieve gedragingen zoals agressie. Ondanks dat 
het voor veel mensen vanzelfsprekend is dat boosheid een negatieve emotie is, wordt 
boosheid anderzijds soms ook als een positieve emotie gezien. Soms staat bij boosheid 
namelijk het belang van anderen centraal. We komen niet alleen voor onszelf op 
wanneer we boosheid voelen, maar staan ook op voor het recht van anderen. 
Bijvoorbeeld, we kunnen boos worden omdat we zien dat een onschuldig iemand in 
elkaar geslagen wordt. In dit soort situaties leidt boosheid niet alleen tot agressief of 
bestraffend gedrag naar de veroorzaker van het onrecht, maar ook tot het helpen van 
het slachtoffer van onrecht (ook wel prosociaal gedrag genoemd). Oftewel, boosheid 
ontstaat uit schade dat onszelf of anderen aangedaan wordt en motiveert zowel 
positieve als negatieve gedragingen om de schade te herstellen. Echter, hoewel we 
weten dat boosheid zowel positief als negatief gedrag kan uitlokken, is nog onduidelijk 
wanneer, waarom en hoe het tot deze gedragingen leidt. Het onderzoek in dit 
proefschrift richt zich daarop. 
  
Het onderscheid tussen boos worden omdat jou iets aangedaan wordt 
(eerstepersoonsboosheid) of omdat een ander iets aangedaan wordt 
(derdepersoonsboosheid) blijkt belangrijk in het verklaren van gedrag dat voortkomt 
uit boosheid (Hoofdstuk 2). Boosheid kan bijvoorbeeld leiden tot agressie, wraak en 
straffen als reactie op onrecht dat ons wordt aangedaan. Maar als we kijken naar 
derdepersoonssituaties dan zijn er duidelijke indicaties dat boosheid prosociale 
consequenties kan hebben. Zo is er een relatie gelegd tussen boosheid en het steunen 
van minder bedeelden, het helpen van slachtoffers en compensatie aan slachtoffers. Dit 
komt doordat je je in derdepersoonssituaties kan richten op zowel een dader als een 
slachtoffer en zulke situaties dus toegang geven tot prosociale gedragingen. In 
eerstepersoonssituaties kun je je alleen richten op de dader waardoor straffen logischer 
is. Kortom, als je boos bent om wat jou is aangedaan, zal je dus meestal geneigd zijn de 
dader te straffen. Maar als je boos bent om wat een ander is aangedaan, kun je zowel 
geneigd zijn om de dader te straffen als het slachtoffer te helpen. Hoofdstuk 2 omvat een 




uitgebreide review van de literatuur over de gedragingen die voortkomen uit boosheid 
in eerstepersoons- en derdepersoonssituaties en legt uit dat deze gedragingen lijken te 
ontstaan doordat boze mensen onrecht willen rechtzetten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de mate waarin mensen eerstepersoonsboosheid en 
derdepersoonsboosheid ervaren in het dagelijks leven en of boosheid leidt tot 
prosociaal gedrag in derdepersoonssituaties. In de studies wordt boosheid opgewekt 
door deelnemers situaties te laten beschrijven waarin zij zelf boos waren 
(herinneringstaak) of door deelnemers een boosheidopwekkende situatie te laten lezen 
en hen te vragen zich voor te stellen hoe zij zich zouden voelen (scenario). Vervolgens 
geven deelnemers aan in hoeverre ze bereid zouden zijn om een dader te straffen of een 
slachtoffer te compenseren in een onrechtvaardige situatie. Als deelnemers ervoor 
kiezen om het slachtoffer te compenseren, kan dat ook voortkomen uit empathie in 
plaats van boosheid. Daarom is ook gemeten hoe empathisch deelnemers zijn. 
Resultaten tonen aan dat boosheid in eerstepersoons- en derdepersoonssituaties even 
vaak ervaren wordt. We voelen dus even vaak boosheid om wat onszelf is aangedaan als 
om wat een ander is aangedaan. Daarnaast hebben boze deelnemers in 
derdepersoonssituaties een voorkeur voor het compenseren van een slachtoffer boven 
het straffen van een dader. Het effect van boosheid op compensatie kan niet verklaard 
worden door mogelijke empathische gevoelens. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een verklaring voor prosociaal gedrag vanuit boosheid, namelijk dat 
boze mensen onrecht willen rechtzetten. In de studies wordt boosheid opgewekt door 
inleving in scenario’s waarin iemand onrecht wordt aangedaan en lezen deelnemers 
vervolgens of het onrecht al is rechtgezet of niet. Bijvoorbeeld, doordat de politie de 
dader al heeft gestraft of dat de verzekeringsmaatschappij de schade van een slachtoffer 
al heeft gecompenseerd. Vervolgens geven deelnemers aan in hoeverre zij boosheid 
ervaren en bereid zijn zich prosociaal te gedragen naar het slachtoffer. Resultaten uit 
vijf studies laten zien dat boosheid alleen leidt tot prosociaal gedrag naar een slachtoffer 
wanneer een deelnemer met dat gedrag onrecht kan herstellen. Wanneer onrecht al 
hersteld is door een andere partij, zoals de politie of de verzekeringsmaatschappij, leidt 
dit tot een afname van zowel de mate van ervaren boosheid als de motivatie tot 
prosociaal gedrag naar het slachtoffer. Oftewel, als iemand anders de schade al hersteld 




heeft, hoef je dat zelf dus niet meer te doen. In dat geval worden mensen minder boos 
en vertonen zij minder prosociaal gedrag naar het slachtoffer. Uit de resultaten blijkt 
bovendien dat mensen minder boos zijn en minder prosociaal gedrag vertonen wanneer 
de andere partij het slachtoffer compenseert dan wanneer de andere partij de dader 
straft. Het lijkt er dus op dat mensen compenseren eerder als herstel van onrecht zien 
dan straffen. Niet gek dus dat mensen een voorkeur hebben voor compensatie boven 
straffen (zie Hoofdstuk 3). Het onrecht is dan in hun ogen meer rechtgezet waardoor zij 
minder restgevoelens van boosheid ervaren en zij zich minder geroepen voelen om zelf 
door prosociaal gedrag het onrecht recht te zetten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 bekijkt hoe robuust de voorkeur voor compenseren boven straffen is. In 
zes studies kunnen deelnemers met hun eigen geld een onrechtvaardige verdeling 
rechttrekken door geld weg te nemen bij de verdeler (i.e., straffen van de dader) of door 
middel van het geven van geld aan de ontvanger (i.e., compenseren van het slachtoffer). 
Deelnemers krijgen verschillende scenario’s te lezen en er wordt gevraagd in hoeverre 
zij naar aanleiding van die scenario’s zouden straffen of compenseren. Bijvoorbeeld, er 
wordt gekeken naar de keuze voor straffen en compenseren als deelnemers meer 
mogen wegnemen (als straf) dan mogen geven (als compensatie), als de dader 
meerdere slachtoffers kan maken of heeft gemaakt, en als de keuze tot straffen of 
compenseren zelf gemaakt mag worden of door een ander. Uit de resultaten blijkt 
echter dat deze variaties in sommige gevallen wel tot een verhoging van straffen leiden, 
maar nooit de keuze voor compenseren overtreft. Uit deze studies blijkt dus een 
robuuste voorkeur voor compensatie boven straffen. Met andere woorden, als mensen 
in een onrechtvaardige situatie de keuze krijgen om te compenseren of straffen, dan 
zouden ze in een variatie aan situaties de voorkeur geven aan compenseren.  
 
Hoofdstuk 6 demonstreert een mogelijk toepassing van de prosociale consequenties van 
boosheid in een consumentencontext. Er wordt specifiek gekeken of boosheid leidt tot 
prosociaal gedrag in de vorm van het doneren aan goed doel als men met deze donatie 
onrecht kan herstellen. In de studie wordt boosheid opgewekt aan de hand van een 
herinneringstaak. Vervolgens wordt deelnemers gevraagd in hoeverre ze bereid zijn 
geld te doneren aan twee verschillende goede doelen. Deze goede doelen verschillen 
van elkaar in de bijdrage die ze kunnen leveren met het geld dat ingezameld wordt. Het 




ene goede doel heeft een specifiek herstellende functie: Met de donatie worden 
vrouwen die slachtoffer zijn van mensenhandel gecompenseerd zodat zij een nieuw 
leven kunnen starten. Het andere goede doel heeft een niet-herstellende functie: Met de 
donatie worden vrouwen die slachtoffer zijn van natuurrampen en in crisiscentra 
verblijven opgevangen. Ook hier kan het zijn dat het doneren van geld voortkomt uit 
empathie in plaats van boosheid. Daarom wordt gekeken naar het empathisch 
vermogen bij deelnemers als mogelijk alternatieve verklaring voor de mate van 
doneren. Resultaten laten zien dat boze mensen meer geld doneren wanneer de donatie 
een herstellende functie heeft dan wanneer deze geen herstellende functie heeft. 
Mensen die geen boosheid ervaren doneren even veel geld aan een goed doel met een 
herstellende als een niet-herstellende functie. In overeenstemming met de resultaten uit 
Hoofdstuk 4 leidt boosheid alleen tot prosociaal gedrag als hiermee onrecht rechtgezet 
kan worden en – in overeenstemming met Hoofdstuk 3 – kan het effect van boosheid op 
donaties onafhankelijk van empathie ontstaan. Empathie is wel een onafhankelijke 
voorspeller van doneren: Als mensen een hogere mate van empathie hebben, doneren 
ze meer geld. Dit gebeurt echter onafhankelijk van of het doel een herstellende functie 
heeft of niet. Hoe empathisch mensen zijn kan daarmee niet verklaren waarom boze 
mensen specifiek meer geld doneren aan een doel met een herstellende functie.  
 
Hoofdstuk 7, tenslotte, vat de resultaten en conclusies van alle eerder hoofdstukken 
samen. Specifiek kan het volgende geconcludeerd worden: (1) boosheid in 
eerstepersoons- en derdepersoonssituaties wordt even vaak ervaren, (2) manieren om 
onrecht recht te zetten zijn zowel negatief (zoals het straffen van een dader) als 
prosociaal (zoals het compenseren van een slachtoffer), (3) boosheid leidt tot prosociaal 
gedrag als men daarmee onrecht kan rechtzetten, (4) boze mensen geven de voorkeur 
aan het herstellen van onrecht via prosociaal gedrag en (5) prosociale gedragingen die 
voortkomen uit boosheid kunnen leiden tot hogere donaties aan een goed doel. Door te 
laten zien dat boosheid tot meer diverse gedragingen kan leiden dan alleen negatief en 
agressief gedrag en door te laten zien wanneer en waarom deze gedragingen tot stand 
komen, schijnt dit proefschrift nieuw licht op boosheid. Zoals de lotusbloem op de cover 
van dit proefschrift vanuit de modder ontluikt en voor nieuwe inzichten staat, wordt het 
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